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Considerable research has been devoted to detailing how news framing structures public 
opinion. As a major rhetoric device to present information to the public, framing has the 
capacity of enlightening the public on the costs and benefits of particular policy choices. 
However, few studies have examined media framing of international trade and its impact on 
public opinion, and no study to date has connected how framing of international agreements 
might affect individual investment attentions. This study attempts to fill this gap in the 
literature by examining individual responses to pro-trade versus anti-trade and gain versus 
lose frames. It further extends existing literature by considering the impact of framing on 
individual investment intentions suggesting that framing has effects beyond opinion and may 
impact actual behaviors. 
Even though the frames in communication do influence individual preference choices 
concerning foreign trade policies, these policy options are also subject to powerful influence 
of individual pre-existing schemas about international trade. These predispositions could help 
not only redistribute the scarce resource of attention and construe incoming stimuli, but also 





1.1 Public Opinion on International Trade 
The United States has been a major stakeholder and initiator in the global system and has 
been actively engaged in world economic liberalization (Crane, 2008). Succeeding in passing 
the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) in 2005, the U.S. government is 
pushing now for congressional approval of the Colombia Agreement, which, according to 
President Bush, is of great importance to the U.S. economic interests (Weisman, 2008). 
Unfortunately, the American public demonstrates less enthusiasm for international trade than 
the politically and economically influential do. Individual Americans seem to worry more 
about the negative outcomes of foreign trade and regard economic globalization more as a 
losing battle against cheap labor in developing countries (Porter, 2008). For example, CNN 
conducted a survey in June 2008, and 51 percent of the respondents saw foreign trade as a 
threat to the U.S. economy. This figure increased by six percentage points relative to a similar 
question asked in Oct. 2007. In a Los Angeles Times survey in May 2008, half of the 
respondents believed that free international trade had hurt the U.S. economy, whereas merely 
26 percent people believed free international trade had helped the U.S. economy. Similar 
results could also be found in surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center and NBC 
News/Wall Street Journal Poll (See Table 1).  






What do you think foreign trade means for America? Do 
you see foreign trade more as an opportunity for economic 
growth through increased U.S. exports or a threat to the 
























Generally speaking, do you believe that free international 
















In general, do you think that free trade agreements – like 
NAFTA, and the policies of the WTO – have been a good 











                                                        










Do you think the fact that the American economy has 
become increasingly global is good because it has opened 
up new markets for American products and resulted in 
more jobs, or bad because it has subjected American 
































Foreign trade has been good for the U.S. economy, because
demand for U.S. products abroad has resulted in economic 
growth and jobs for Americans here at home or foreign 
trade has been bad for the U.S. economy, because cheap 






























In general, do you think that free trade with other countries 
is good or bad for the United States? 
 
Do you think U.S. participation in the WTO is good or bad 
















Thinking of the last 12 months, have you, someone in your 
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The recessionary economy may be one of the reasons that lead to these highly negative 
sentiments toward international trade among the American public. However, these strong 
sentiments could not be attributed totally to the economic recession, because some surveys 
were conducted in 2000 when the American economy did not encounter as much turmoil as 
today, and less than 20 percent of the respondents acknowledged in 2004 that they had direct 
experience of job loss or heard of anybody laid off due to job outsourcing (See Table 1). The 
question wordings emphasizing different aspects of international trade may be also part of the 
reasons (Hiscox, 2006). For example, when public opinion on free trade and U.S. 
participation in the WTO was required, the majority of the respondents endorsed the 
America’s role in economic globalization (64% and 62%). In contrast, when the logically 
equivalent question was posed with an emphasis placed on the impact on jobs and wages, the 
majority of the respondents believed international trade had hurt the U.S. economy. These 
variations in public opinion on foreign trade due to different question wordings suggest that 
attitudes toward international trade are not set, and in fact are dependent upon how the 
question is framed. This then raises the possibility that media framing might lead the public 
to certain attitudes.  
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1.2 News Coverage of International Trade 
A systematic and comprehensive content analysis of news coverage of international trade 
in the mainstream news media in the past decade is beyond the scope of this study. However, 
a brief and synthesized description of how news media report international trade in the past 
half year may shed light on whether the news coverage of international trade relates to the 
public opinion on foreign trade policies. The selected mainstream news media for this study 
was the New York Times. Choosing the New York Times as a representative of the U.S. 
mainstream news media was due to its prominence and influence among government officials 
and the other politically and economically influential in the U.S., especially regarding its 
coverage of international events and agenda-setting influence on other media institutions 
(Gitlin, 2003). The data for content analysis were searched from Section A of the New York 
Times in the Lexis-Nexis database, with subject focusing on international trade. As a result, 
35 such news stories were found.  
Table 2. News Stories and Editorials in Section A of the New York Times (2-8/2008)  
News  Editorial 
Page 1 6 2 Risk (Anti-trade)2  
Other Pages 20 7 Neutral 
Total 26 9 35 
 
 Some of the news stories under analysis covered international trade in a broader manner, 
extending the discussion beyond the impact of foreign trade on benefits for American 
consumers or the national interests of the United States. Among the stories are: 
 --“After 7 Years, Talks Collapse on World Trade,” in which the developed countries 
and big developing countries were blaming each other for inhibiting the overall agreements 
of the Doha Talks by sticking to their own interests (Castle & Landler, 2008); 
 --“German Milk Goes from Cow to Drain in Dairy Strike,” which showed that 
German framers dumped 60 percent of the country’s milk production to boycott a new 
                                                        
2 The criterion for determining whether an editorial is pro-trade or risk (anti-trade) is whether international trade (free trade) 
is regarded as beneficial to the U.S. economy or other national interests. Some editorials may advocate international trade for 
its benefits to poor developing countries. But benefits to other countries may not necessarily do good to the United States or 
may even harm the U.S. interests; hence, editorials suggesting this kind of opinion are regarded as neutral.  
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decision the European Union made on production quotas (Kulish, 2008); and  
 --“President Fails to Budge OPEC on Production,” which uncovered the 
disagreement on the soaring oil prices between OPEC and the United States (Mouawad, 
2008).  
For those news stories concentrating on international trade’s impact on the U.S. national 
interests, protectionist concerns or risks posed to American people prevailed among the 
coverage. Senators Obama and Clinton’s voices seemed to be prevalent in these news stories. 
For example, when talking about a pending pact with South Korea, Senator Obama was 
quoted saying: “You can’t get beef into Japan and Korea, even though, obviously, we have 
the highest safety standards of anybody, but they don’t want to have that competition from 
U.S. producers. If South Korea is selling hundreds of thousands of cars to the United States 
and we can only sell less than 5,000 in South Korea, something is wrong” (Rohter, 2008). 
Another reason the Democrats opposed this deal was the fear that the pact would cost jobs 
and do further damage to the U.S. automaking industry (Weismar, 2008A). As for Colombian 
Trade Deal, the benefit lied in its capacity to open one more market for American exports. 
However, critics have worried about the side effects of the trade deal on job loss due to easier 
outsourcing to Colombia, even though President Bush has tried to sell the deal for its 
potential consolidation on the freedom and peace in the region (Weisman, 2008B). Even the 
NAFTA was under attack because more could have been done to protect American workers 
and the environment (Cooper & Broder, 2008). 
With respect to editorials, there were two dedicated explicitly to advocating the 
protectionist policies and attacking international trade (free trade) for leaving the country’s 
economy and workers in a fragile status. One of the editorials argued that high degree of 
global economic interdependence might cause easier manipulation over a country’s political 
and economic goals by irrational foreign governments. This editorial disregarded the 
assumption that profitable international trade would prevent wars (Krugman, 2008). The 
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other editorial criticized modern free traders in the U.S. for highlighting only bright lines of 
international trade without paying any attention to job loss, trade deficits or depreciation of 
dollars and suggested that unbridled free trade was not in the national interests of the United 
States (Lighthizer, 2008). Another editorial did not deny international trade had brought to the 
United States such benefits as foreign markets and cheap foreign commodities. But it 
criticized the U.S. government for doing less for the most vulnerable and suggested that a 
complete social welfare network may be more effective than protectionist policies (Porter, 
2008). Overall this review suggests that the news coverage of international trade tends to 
stress potential risks while neglecting the benefits to the overall well-being of the country. 
What impact does this pattern of news coverage have on individual perceptions of 
international trade? 
1.3 Significance of the Study 
As John Zaller (1992) has observed, the information that reaches the public can never be 
a panorama of all that has happened, but instead is a highly stereotyped and oversimplified 
account of what politicians and public affairs and media practitioners deem as important. On 
one hand, these media elites are actively engaged in selling their preferred points of view on 
the platform set up by the news media (Lippmann, 1922). On the other hand, the public relies 
heavily on these media practitioners for presentation of events beyond their direct experience 
and to fuel construction of the “pictures in their heads” (p18). One rhetoric device these 
media practitioners regularly use to convey information is through framing (Shen, 2004b). 
Framing is a process through which an issue could be depicted in an advantageous way by 
telling people what is relevant and important, and consequently influence public opinion 
(Nelson & Oxley, 1997). Unlike the psychological term framing which is defined as the 
“influence on judgment resulting from the way information is presented” (Gilovich et al., 
2006, p.397), framing here is defined in a broader manner, as normally referred to in the 
fields of mass communication and political science. According to Tankard et al.(1991), a 
5 
 
frame is “the central organizing idea for news content that supplies a context and suggests 
what the issue is through the use of selection, emphasis, exclusion and elaboration” (p.3). 
Such amplification of certain elements instead of others focuses individual attention on these 
elements when they make sense of public controversies (Iyengar, 1987). As a result, with few 
alternatives to choose from, individuals could easily endorse such message frames, and these 
framing effects may be most obvious at those events that are “out of reach, out of sight, out of 
mind” (Lippmann, 1922, p.18). 
Individual Americans might have bits of information about international trade. But for 
most Americans, international trade is beyond their direct experience. International trade is 
such a complicated issue that even those Americans who have access to most relevant 
information have been fighting with one another on the merits of international trade. For 
instance, in 2005, the House of Representatives had a heated discussion over the 
controversial Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and narrowly passed the bill 
by a margin of two votes, even though CAFTA is expected to realize an additional $1.5 
billion in export sales (Coyne, 2005). Relative to those political elites, individual Americans 
have much less information about international trade. Consequently, how trade agreements 
are framed and how those questions are worded in surveys will sway public opinion about 
trade preferences (Hiscox, 2006). Relative to individuals receiving a pro-trade frame or no 
frame at all, individuals exposed to an anti-trade frame preferred trade restriction (Hiscox, 
2006). This claim was supported by some other scholars who found that the majority of 
survey respondents favored protectionist trade policies (Mayda & Rodric, 2005; O’Rourke & 
Sinnott, 2002; Scheve & Slaughter, 2001a). Contrary to these studies, Hiscox (2006) found 
that respondents who favored increasing cooperation with other countries reached 61 percent. 
Nevertheless, the framing effects still prevailed, with respondents administered under 




This controversy over trade attitudes could not be attributed simply to the manipulation 
of the news media through framing, but could also reflect the values and beliefs embedded in 
people’s minds when they decipher incoming information and consequently make judgments. 
According to Zaller (1992), “every opinion is a marriage of information and predisposition: 
information to form a mental picture of the given issue, and predisposition to motivate some 
conclusion about it” (p.6). In face of controversial issues, individual Americans may take into 
consideration a wide array of relevant values and beliefs so as to make rational choices 
(Feldman & Zaller, 1992). This is also true with the public opinion on foreign policy, which 
is subject to heavy influence of domain-specific postures or knowledge structures (Hurwitz & 
Peffley, 1986, 1987). Such pre-existing values and beliefs, i.e. individual schemas, may even 
maximize or minimize the level of framing effects, and this moderating effect is apparently 
more obvious when the message frames concur with individuals’ pre-existing schemas 
(Entman, 1993), activating mental movement in the same direction (Shen, 2004b).  
This study extends the research of message framing to the arena of economics and 
explores whether news coverage of international trade programs, by focusing on pro-trade 
versus anti-trade characters as well as loss vs. gain frames (negativity bias), has any effect on 
public input into specific foreign trade policy and consequently influence their investment 
intentions. Public opinion on foreign policy was once deemed as valueless (Almond, 1950). 
Although political scientists have been challenging this conventional wisdom and have found 
that public foreign policy preferences are quite constant and rational, supervised by 
domain-specific postures or core values (Achen, 1975; Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987), the capacity 
of individual Americans to make rational choices is still under doubt due to the phenomenal 
susceptibility of the public to frames in communication (Lippmann, 1922; Zaller, 1992).  
Many studies have concentrated on framing effects, but few have focused attention on 
the framing effects of news coverage of international trade programs on public preferences 
for foreign trade policies. Even less have dealt with individual investment intentions and 
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whether these volitions are influenced by news reports about international cooperation. What 
makes the situation even more complicated is that media frames seldom appear in isolation in 
the news coverage of international trade, but rather work together to influence how 
individuals interpret information (Shah et al., 2004). Furthermore, these framing effects may 
not function independently but be limited or mediated by pre-existing beliefs about 
international trade. All these may contribute to the varying levels of cognitive and attitudinal 
responses in individuals.  
The importance of this topic also lies in the fact that economic news has become an 
inseparable part of American life. Economic activities, whether domestic or international 
transactions, have become of greater concern to American people (Coolidge, 1925). In order 
to keep well informed and make rational choices concerning stock investment or equity 
owning, individuals have to rely on the news media, their major source of information 
(Lippman, 1922), for analysis of economic policies and interpretation of listed companies’ 
business and financial performance. With the increase of the national desire for economic 
news, more and more media begin catering to this need; and the 1990s witnessed a rapid 
growth in economic news coverage. During that decade, the amount of space dedicated to 
economic news jumped from 7 percent to 15 percent, making news in this genre the fastest 
expanding sector in news media institutions (Roush, 2006). Nevertheless, compared to this 
sharp increase in the desire for economic news, academic research has not increased 
proportionately. This is especially true in the area of international trade, which has increasing 
influence on individual Americans’ routine life, economic well-being and even career 
success. 
This study conducts a 2 X 2 survey-based experiment to test the framing effects of 
business news, which is framed as either anti-trade or pro-trade, and gain or loss. Preexisting 
belief systems of the experiment participants about free trade are investigated to see whether 
and to what extent these belief systems play a role in directing people’s understanding of 
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economic information. In addition, the experiment participants’ attitudinal responses and 





2.1 Framing Mechanism and Framing Effects  
Framing is extremely powerful in swaying public opinion, because it has the ability to 
endorse certain aspects of an issue to the negligence of others (Lawrence, 2000). According 
to Entman (1993) “to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them 
more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem 
definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the 
item described” (p.52). If framing could influence how audiences think about an issue, it does 
so by “invoking interpretive schemas that influence the interpretation of incoming 
information, but not by making aspects of the issue more salient” (Scheufele, 2000, p.309). In 
other words, frames shape public opinions by “stressing specific values, facts, and other 
considerations, endowing them with greater apparent relevance to the issue than they might 
appear to have under an alternative frame” (Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997, p.569).  
Relative to inaccessible information, accessible information are more likely to influence 
decision-making (Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997). But this accessibility model provides 
merely a partial explanation to the mechanism of framing effects, because not all accessible 
considerations are treated equally in the process of opinion formation or judgment making. 
(Nelson, Oxley, & Clawson, 1997). According to van der Plight and Eiser (1984), an opinion 
toward an issue is composed of different considerations or attributes about this issue and 
weights accorded to each of these considerations. Frames shape public opinion not through 
changing the attributes or considerations of the issue but rather through magnifying the 
psychological importance of certain aspects of the issue (Nelson, Clawson & Oxley, 1997). In 
Nelson et al.’s (1997) words, “Frames tell people how to weight the often conflicting 
considerations that enter into everyday political deliberations” (p.226). They (Nelson, Oxley, 
& Clawson, 1997) demonstrated the notion of framing effects in a simple equation: A = ∑
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ViWi, where an attitude toward an issue was the summation of all attributes (considerations) 
assigned with different weights.  
The study of framing traces back to attribution theory, which concerns how people 
explain behaviors of others and themselves (Heider & Simmel, 1944). As Heider and Simmel 
(1944) put it, attribution links an observed action to a person who implements the action and 
the need motivating such an action. Lippmann suggested that the world was so complicated 
and so hard to understand that people had to rely on simpler models such as causal relations 
to make sense of world events (Lippmann, 1922). News frames just offer such a kind of 
shortcut, bridging the gap between the socially and culturally complicated and unfamiliar and 
daily interactions people are good at (Friedland & Zhong, 1996).  
Generally, people attribute a happening in their living environment to either personal 
causes or impersonal causes (societal environment factor) (Heider, 1959). Goffman (1974) 
endorsed this two-factor argument, but he named the two factors natural frame and societal 
frame. He explained that “natural frames help to interpret events originating from natural and 
non-intentional causes, while societal frames help to locate, perceive, identify and label 
actions and events that stem from intentional human action” (p.21). Iyengar (1991) extended 
the attribution theory to explanation of how individuals made sense of public issues. He 
found that attribution of causal and treatment responsibility had great effects on public 
opinion about political issues (Iyengar, 1991). Such causal beliefs were so deeply rooted in 
human’s minds that individuals often based their understanding of public issues 
unconsciously on these causal explanations (Iyengar, 1991).  
To clarify complicated events in simpler manner and to cater to individual inclination of 
categorizing incoming information, the mass media purposefully frame public issues 
(Tuchman, 1978). Framing public issues in distinct ways would suggest different underlying 
causal and treatment responsibilities, thus insinuating potential remedies for the problems 
(Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997). Iyengar (1987) further contended that framing the same 
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issue differently would call upon different reference points, thus legitimating completely 
different strategies for decision making. Sometimes, even a semantic or terminological 
change involving one or two words in describing an issue may also cause this different choice 
of strategies (Kim et al., 2002).  
According to Iyengar (1991), an issue could be framed in either an episodic or thematic 
form. He explained that episodic newscasts treated a public issue as a concrete but isolated 
event, attributing the problem to internal predispositions of victims, whereas thematic 
newscasts described the issue in a broader manner, linking the controversy to larger societal 
or contextual backdrops, thus charging impersonal factors for causing the problem and with 
the responsibility to mend it (Iyengar, 1991). For example, different responsibility 
explanations may result from whether a terrorist attack or a poverty issue is encoded as an 
insular phenomenon or an outcome of larger social interactions (Iyengar, 1987). Thus, the 
ways how a situation is framed by the news media could furnish different reference points, 
producing different perceptions of and treatment solutions to the issue in individuals 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). 
Consistent with these studies on framing effects, Shen (2004a) found that news frames 
had a powerful effect on audiences’ interpretation of and attitudes toward an issue. For 
instance, people’s attitudes toward welfare reform were heavily associated with the media 
frames they exposed to. Likewise, a free-speech frame depicting a KKK rally in terms of civil 
liberty might activate a different tolerance level in audiences from describing it as a violence 
inducement, with demonstrators shouting slogans and burning symbols under police 
surveillance (Nelson, Calwson & Oxley, 1997). Cappella and Jamieson (1997) suggested that 
strategic news could cue in a strategy-based schema in audiences and activate strategic 
information, leading to attribution of a politician’s actions to his/her desire to win an election. 
In contrast, issue-oriented news coverage might activate issue-relevant information and shape 
candidates as problem solvers without personal needs. Fu (2005) endorsed such an argument. 
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He found that strategic news frames were often used to describe President Roh as a party 
leader and this strategy severely harmed his image, whereas President Kim enjoyed the image 
of a government leader with the help of issue frames.  
Nelson and Kinder (1996) upheld the notion that news frames shaped public opinion 
through limiting the considerations people might take into account. For example, news stories 
emphasizing social groups would squeeze out other important arguments through 
emphatically channeling in group-relevant schemas. Even though the group sentiment is not 
unusual in the American public, people are still susceptible to how an issue is framed (Nelson 
& Kinder, 1996). In other words, if the moral qualifications of welfare policy receivers are 
under suspicion, the group sentiment intensifies. By contrast, when the beneficiaries are out 
of the radar of the news media, the group sentiment diminishes (Nelson & Kinder, 1996). 
Nelson and Oxley (1999) studied framing effects on a land development project. They 
found that relative to participants in an environmental framing condition, those exposed to an 
economic frame documented a more favorable attitude for the proposed project. In contrast, 
participants receiving the environmental frame disfavored the development project and 
worried about environmental degradation. In the same vein, participants exposed to the 
economic frame outweighed the economic consequences of the project than the 
environmental consideration in their judgment of the project (Nelson & Oxley, 1999).  
With respect to the framing effects on international trade, Hiscox (2006) found that 
individuals exposed to either an anti-trade frame or combination of an anti-trade frame and a 
pro-trade frame were more likely to favor trade restriction by a margin of 19 percent and 20 
percent respectively, compared to those administered under a pro-trade frame or no frame at 
all. Inoue and Patterson (2007) suggested that how the U.S. media framed Japan’s economic 
activities in relation to the U.S. economy shaped Americans’ perceptions of Japan. 
Specifically, when Japan was framed as an economic threat to the U.S. economy, the negative 
sentiments toward Japan intensified. 
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However, public issues of great importance are often controversial and complicated, and 
rarely could an audience watch a media presentation of public debates in a single-frame 
construct. To uphold journalistic tenets like objectivity and neutrality, the media institutions 
often encapsulated a set of competing frames in one story. For example, news coverage of 
abortion was often subject to both pro-life and pro-choice frames (Beck et al., 1995). In the 
meantime, people, when contemplating about an issue, may take into account more than one 
considerations to decipher causal responsibility and determine appropriate solutions (Nelson 
& Kinder, 1996).  
Even though there are some studies exploring the framing effects on foreign trade policy 
preferences, less research has examined the framing effects of economic news stories on 
public opinion about international trade, let alone to say the effects of domain-specific 
pre-existing schemas on public involvement with foreign trade. To date, no research has 
examined the influence of multiple news frames on public opinion on foreign trade. In reality, 
rarely is a public issue of controversy one-dimensional and media frames often work in 
conjunction with each other in the news coverage of international trade (Shah et al., 2004). 
Hence, audiences may be more susceptive to multiple frames, especially when they know 
little about an issue (Nelson, 1999). 
2.2 Negativity Biases (Loss vs. Gain Frame) and Individual Behavior 
Negativity bias indicates that in most situations, “negative events are more salient, potent, 
dominant in combinations, and generally efficacious than positive events” (Rozin & 
Royzman, 2001, p.297). In other words, one unit of stimuli input in a negative motivational 
system would generate more output than the same amount of input in a positive motivational 
system (Cacioppo et al., 1997). Hence, people or organisms may demonstrate stronger 
reaction in psychological and behavioral responses to negative stimuli than positive ones of 




According to Soroka (2006), studies in psychology offer insights for these varying 
responses to positive vs. negative information. Cognitive weighting theory suggests that 
information that is novel or rarely available tends to grab more attention, because it seems to 
offer more information (Fiske, 1980). Even if a piece of negative information needs not to be 
extremely negative, the less frequency in occurrence may guarantee disproportionate 
consideration than otherwise (Reyes et al, 1980). Similarly, impression formation theory 
suggests that relative to positive personality traits, negative traits seem to have a more 
powerful effect on individuals’ impression formation (Singh & Teoh, 2000; Wyer, 1970). For 
instance, if one gains a positive seven on a kindness rating and a negative seven on an 
honesty rating, the combination of the two does not make an overall impression of the person 
at zero but drags one’s overall image to a negative three in the likeability scale (Skowronski 
& Carlston, 1989).  
Research in economics also sheds light on this asymmetric scenario. Prospect theory 
postulates that people subject evaluation of prospective economic outcomes to a neutral 
reference point. Outcomes above the point are rated positively as gains and outcomes below 
are negatively associated and treated as losses (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). For a person, 
shift of the reference point would modify the connotation of the outcome (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981). As such, an outcome being treated as either a loss or a gain may depend 
heavily on the location of the reference point (Roszkowski & Snelbecker, 1990).  
Another argument might shed further light on this asymmetric response to negative 
information. Shah et al. (2004) suggested that framing a problem in a loss condition could 
force people to think more deeply about the issue. In reality, negative events are more likely 
to be regarded as a signal of danger and to mobilize all resources of an organism (Taylor, 
1991). As a result, more weight would be accorded to the information that is critical to the 
survival of the organism. Therefore, negative information is often regarded as more important 
and valuable than positive information (Siegrist & Cvetkovich, 2001). 
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The status quo is normally regarded as a reference point for evaluating incoming 
information. However, an expectation that deviates from the status quo is often adopted in 
reality as a lever for judging information (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). For example, people 
expect to get their monthly payments in full amounts. An additional tax cut in a certain month 
would be regarded not as a reduced gain but as a sure loss (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In 
many domains, people tend to put their psychological anchors in the positive side of their 
evaluation scales (Slowronski & Carlston, 1989). Losing an object one just owned would 
result in totally different psychological response from having the same object one has never 
possessed before (Rozin & Royzman, 2001). Actually, that people have a tendency to anchor 
their reference point in the positive side of their judgment scale continuum is implicit in the 
impression formation theory, cognitive weighting theory and prospect theory. Soroka (2006) 
attributed this to the optimistic nature in people about the future. Compared to a person who 
locates his/her expectation at a neutral position, a rating of negative four would have greater 
influence on a person with an expectation of positive two (Sherif & Sherif, 1976). This also 
explains why an economic indicator, like GDP, which meets merely the expectation of the 
society, would have no effects on the performance of stock markets. But if this indicator 
increases by 1.5 percent, falling short of the market expectation at 3 percent, it would push 
the stock markets downside. 
People respond differently to a loss frame as against a gain frame. According to the 
prospect theory, a loss may generate more serious reaction in a person than a gain of equal 
value (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). To put it in Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) words, “the 
displeasure associated with losing a sum of money is generally greater than the pleasure 
associated with winning the same amount” (p.454). Furthermore, the value function for a loss 
condition does not equal the value function for a gain condition; moving the reference point 
will affect a person’s choice options (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979, p.286) used an example to demonstrate this phenomenon:  
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Image a person who is involved in a business venture, has already lost $2000 
and is now facing a choice between a sure gain of $1000 and an even chance to 
win $2000 or nothing. If he has not yet adapted to his losses, he is likely to code 
the problem as a choice between (-$2000, .50) and (-$1000) rather than as a choice 
between ($2000, .50) and ($1000). 
 
Whether the businessman has adapted to the losses and set up a new reference point would 
definitely lead to different choice options, with the later option more rational and the former 
more risky (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  
With respect to individual behavioral responses, risk taking is more likely to occur when 
choices involve losses, whereas risk-aversion is more popular when choices are framed as 
gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1981). Bowmen et al. (1999) found that downward economic 
trend seemed to have a much more powerful effect on consumption than economy growth. As 
for investment, bad economic information is highly correlated with a firm’s determination to 
invest. To put it another way, if a firm anticipates a recessionary economy, the probability of 
its reinvestment may drop. Even if it continues investing, the investment level would descend. 
In contrast, expectation of a good economic return does not guarantee a corresponding 
increase in a firm’s investment (Svensson, 2000). This asymmetric response to negative vs. 
positive economic information also influences individual investment strategies in stock 
markets, with bad news more likely to keep investors from selling losers (expecting their 
stocks could appreciate in the future), while good news to motivate them to sell winners 
(Odean, 1998; Shefrin & Statman, 1985). 
This asymmetric response does not apply similarly to all individuals. Barber & Odean 
(2001) argued that men conducted more transactions than women in stock markets, because 
men seemed to be more confident than women in the field of finance. When dealing with 
their own money under the loss frame, subjects of old generation tend to take more risks than 
younger subjects (Roszkowski & Snelbecker, 1990). This is also true of individuals’ political 
behaviors. People who trust the government may give a weight to the same negative 
information twice as much as the weight distrusters of the government assign to the same 
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information (Lau, 1985). In the same vein, the same negative information may have more 
effects on those who care about president’s job performance than those who do not (Lau, 
1985). 
2.3 Negativity Biases and Framing Effects 
The study of negativity bias is heavily associated with the news media, and framing 
effects in particular. Such scholars in political sciences as Chong and Druckman (2007) 
divided the framing effects into two subcategories: emphasis framing effect and equivalency 
framing effect (Chong, Druckman, 2007; Druckman, 2001). Emphasis framing effect refers to 
the effect resulting from stressing certain considerations instead of others (Druckman, 2001). 
Under the condition of negativity bias, it refers to media’s inclination to pay more attention to 
negative news rather than positive one.  
Across a variety of domains in human activities, negative information is regarded as 
more informative and subsequently accorded more weight (Rozin & Royzman, 2001). 
However, news media have been a frequent target for criticism in their asymmetric responses 
to negative information. Scholars like Bagdikian (1987) criticized that news media seemed 
overenthusiastic about events involving conflict or crisis (Patterson, 1997; Shoemaker set al., 
1991), and violent crime in particular (Altheide, 1997). For instance, a scientific research that 
discovered potential cancer risk from a certain radiation would be more likely to appear under 
the radar of the news media than another study indicating no signal of cancer (Koren & Klein, 
1991). However, the most criticized concerning news media’s negativity bias is their 
coverage of economic news, i.e., they are often criticized for their propensity to amplify 
negative economic indexes but neglect economic growth signals (Harrington, 1989). A 
typical instance is that the U.S. news media were blamed for costing former President George 
Bush reelection due to media’s trivializing positive economic symbols.  
Negative economic information has been heavily documented with powerful effects on 
such political behavior as voting for a president or congressional candidates (Aragones, 1997; 
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Goidel & Langley, 1995; Kernell, 1977). Simply put, American voters are more likely to 
attribute recessed U.S. economy to bad performance of the U.S. presidents and the congress 
but rarely award reelection trophy to them for economic growth (Bloom & Price, 1975; 
Claggett, 1986). Some other scholars do not totally agree with this argument, stressing that 
voters give incumbents either reward or punishment based on national economic situations. 
However, they seem to give more weight to negative economic signals than positive 
economic indexes (Headrick & Lanoue, 1991). For instance, those who disapproved of 
president’s job performance were more likely to show up at the voting stands in congressional 
elections than those who endorsed president’s performance (Kernell, 1977).  
International trade could be framed either in an anti-trade (risk) or pro-trade manner, with 
anti-trade framing more likely to arouse trade restriction sentiments in audiences (Hiscox, 
2006). By the same token, the increasing coverage by the U.S media of Japanese economic 
activities as a threat to the U.S economy in the 1990s abruptly turned the positive attitudes in 
Americans toward Japan into negative sentiments (Inoue & Patterson, 2007). 
Scholars like Haller and Norpoth (1997) and Soroka (2006) give several explanations to 
the phenomenon that news media tend to highlight negative information. First, no matter 
what social and cultural functions the news media serve, they are ultimately businesses. 
Therefore, it is of no surprise that they pay more attention to negative information so as to 
attract viewers and meet the bottom-line requirements (Haller & Norpoth, 1997). Second, 
journalists, with no exception to other people, have asymmetric interest in negative 
information, which is viewed as more eye-catching and valuable (Soroka, 2006). Third, the 
news media are entrusted with a responsibility to fulfill the social and cultural function in a 
democracy: to identify social problems and place every aspect of the public sphere under 
scrutiny (Soroka, 2006). Consequently, as Soroka (2006) concluded, “negative media 
coverage increases with signs of economic deterioration, but does not consistently decrease 
with signs of economic improvement” (p.379).  
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The second subcategory of framing effects is equivalency framing effect, which is 
closely related to the negativity bias theory. Consistent with emphasis framing effect, the 
equivalency framing effect also stresses certain consideration but depicts the attribute either 
in a positive or a negative light, with its value logically equivalent to the opposite attribute 
that is not mentioned (Druckman, 2004). For example, half glass of water could be framed as 
either half empty or half full (Roszkowski & Snelbecker, 1990). This semantic difference 
might prompt individuals to change their policy preferences (Chong & Druckman, 2007). For 
example, a policy could be framed either in a positive manner as having the capacity of 
generating a 95% employment rate or in a negative manner as capable of resulting in a 5% 
unemployment rate, and people seem to prefer the first option (Druckman, 2004). 
Commodity attributes are a major research target of the equivalency framing effect. The 
literature on these attribute-framing effects claims that consumers respond more favorably 
toward positive frames than negative frames (Levin et al., 1998). Attribute framing effects 
indicate that negative attribute frames may stimulate unfavorable associations in memory, 
whereas positive attribute frames evoke favorable encodings (Levin & Gaeth, 1988). When 
ground beef is described in a negative light as 25 percent fat, consumers are less enthusiastic 
about the product and rate it as worse tasting than when it is labeled as 75 percent lean (Levin, 
1987). This negative vs. positive equivalency framing effect prevails even when consumers 
actually taste the products (Levin & Gaeth, 1988). In another study, Levin and colleagues 
(1985) argued that subjects’ willingness to gamble depended on whether gambles were 
framed as losses or gains. Consistent with the prospect theory that individuals are loss 
aversive when gain choices are stressed (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984), people prefer to use 
credit cards when credit card processing expense is depicted as a rebate for consumers using 
cash (gain) rather than an extra charge for credit card users (a loss) (Rozin & Royzman, 2001). 
However, not all research approves of such equivalency framing effect. Male (Fagley & 
Miller, 1997) and people who strongly involve with an issue and those who possess firm 
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preexisting political schemas (Levin et al., 1998) are found to be more likely to immune from 
such arbitrary informational presentation. Even the well-known Asian disease experiment 
witnesses no effects under a different contextual background (See Schwarz, 1996).  
This paper would delve into both the emphasis framing effect and the equivalency 
framing effect. Emphasis framing effect would be investigated through describing an 
international cooperation project through either stressing pro-trade considerations or 
highlighting anti-trade attributes. Equivalency framing effect would be examined through 
depicting an unemployment situation either in a positive light or a negative light but with 
equivalent job cuts. The purpose was to investigate whether the framing effects prevailed in 
the news coverage of international cooperation and had any influence on people’s perceptions 
about trade issues. 
2.4 Preexisting Schemas and Framing Effects  
Preexisting schemas refers to prototypes or knowledge structures, where related 
information is stored together in an organized manner (Smith & Zarate, 1990). These 
preexisting schemas could affect a person’s judgment by allocating attention to important 
elements and influencing interpretation and memory of incoming information (Gilovich et. al., 
2006). People do not classify or interpret incoming information randomly but rely heavily on 
these pre-existing and long-standing schemas (Kim et al., 2002). According to Gilovich et al. 
(2006), there are two routes simultaneously involved in understanding of the world. One is a 
bottom-up process and the other is a top-down process. The bottom-up process is responsible 
for receiving outside information, while the top-down process actively filtrates and construes 
incoming stimuli with the help of preexisting schemas. Message frames in the news media 
could concur with people’s preexisting schemas; however, the weights granted to these issue 
frames might not necessarily be the same (Huang, 1996).  
Even though people rely heavily on the news media for information and subject their 
interpretation and decision making to the framing references furnished by the media, they 
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have the capacity of “reviewing and rejecting activated knowledge as irrelevant to the 
judgment they are called on to make” (Price et al., 1997b, p.502). According to Gamson 
(1992), framing references in media discourse are merely one of the resources people resort 
to upon making judgment; popular wisdom and prior knowledge are other resources people 
rely heavily on for understanding of the world. Attention is a scarce resource and could not 
spread evenly upon many things; people subconsciously allocate their attention to the most 
important elements on a given situation with the help of prior knowledge stored in their 
minds (Gilovich et al., 2006). Therefore, the preexisting knowledge stored in the brain could 
affect interpretation of incoming information (Chong & Druckman, 2007), and the more 
ambiguous or unfamiliar a situation is, the more marked impact the preexisting schemas 
would have on public opinion (Trope, 1986).  
Chong and Druckman (2007) suggested that people’s policy preferences were subject to 
the influence of their preexisting schemas. Haider-Markel and Joslyn (2001) found that 
people’s political knowledge over gun control played an important role in directing people’s 
endorsement of Concealed Handgun Law. Unlike Republicans and Independents, who were 
influenced by their preexisting schemas of both individual rights and public safety, 
Democrats were more likely to base their judgment on the public safety principle. By the 
same token, the probability of voting for certain candidates would be determined significantly 
by the association between respondents’ preferences for freedom or equality and their 
perceptions of candidates’ endorsement of which specific political principle (Barker, 2005). 
Lau and Schlesinger (2005) argued that the preexisting schemas that individuals deemed 
relevant in a given situation would be used as a lever to shape public opinion about a certain 
issue and the proposed remedies, and these cognitive schemas were most often the wildly 
accepted social norms. 
Explanation of this phenomenon could go to studies in social psychology. It was found 
that activation of prior knowledge for interpretation of incoming information depended 
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critically on the similarity of the incoming information to prior knowledge (Higgins & Brendl, 
1995). This character-matching process ensured that a given stimuli be encoded with a 
similar pre-existing schema, economizing the resources needed for understanding an issue 
(Andersen et al., 1995). 
Similarly, the public opinion on foreign policy is subject to the influence of prior 
knowledge about foreign affairs. As Shapiro and Page suggested, the public respond to the 
changing international environment in ways “they perceived to be in their own interest or in 
the interest of the nation, based upon common sense, shared values, and common standards 
of judgment” (Shapiro & Page, 1998, p.214). These public foreign policy preferences have 
been widely agreed as rational and consistent (Bardes & Oldendick, 1978; Shapiro & Page, 
1998; Ajuilar, Fordham, & Lynch, 2001). The fluctuations and changes in the public opinion 
about foreign affairs found in previous studies were uncovered to be attributed to 
unrepresentative surveys (Bardes & Oldendick, 1978), misleading foreign policy preference 
indicators (Caspary, 1970), or changing international environment (Shapiro & Page, 1988). 
By general consensus, the public foreign policy preferences does not structure along a 
unidimensional continuum (Bjereld & Ekengren, 1999; Chittick, Billingsley, & Travis, 1995), 
but there have been no agreements as to the number of belief systems that underlie public 
involvement with international interactions. Some scholars suggested a two-dimension model 
(Ajuilar, Fordham, & Lynch, 2001; Bjereld & Ekengren, 1999; Maggiotto & Wittkopf, 1981); 
others preferred a three-dimension configuration, and even some proposed a four-dimension 
system (Richman, Malone, & Nolle, 1997) and a five-dimension pattern (Bjereld & Ekengren, 
1999). This discrepancy may be ascribed either to the different survey question items 
designed to tap foreign policy preferences (Zha & Goidel, 2006) or to the changing 
implication of the same question items under different international environment (Chittick, 




Hurwitz and Peffley (1986, 1987) suggested that the generic criteria that supervised 
individual Americans’ domestic political evaluations might not exert the same function 
involving the public’s foreign policy preferences, and attention should be placed on generic 
criteria that worked at foreign policy domain. This argument was echoed by other scholars 
like Lau and Schlesinger (2005), who proposed that people’s understanding of public policies 
might be constrained by such social practices as culturally-rooted norms or cognitive schemas 
that helped attribute causal and treatment responsibility and allocate the limited social 
resources. Hurwitz and Peffley (1987, 1990) further argued that these foreign-policy generic 
criteria functioned in a hierarchical manner, in which these criteria oversaw the more specific 
foreign policy postures in different sub-domains, which in turn superintended specific foreign 
policies. For example, they found that such foreign policy postures as militarism and 
containment had great influence on individuals’ specific foreign policy attitudes concerning 
defense spending, nuclear policy, military involvement and contra funding. These foreign 
policy postures were subordinate to the knowledge structures such as images of other 
countries, which were then under the guidance of such core values as patriotism, moral 
traditionalism, partisanship and ideology (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1990). 
Nevertheless, the set of preexisting schemas individuals have developed differs from 
person to person. The preexisting schemas people bring into interpretation of incoming 
stimuli may be different due to varied personal experience (Lau & Schlesinger, 2005). The 
same message contents with no wording difference could not guarantee generation of 
identical understandings of the same issue (Kelly, 1995). Shen (2004a) pointed out, 
“individual issue schemas could enhance or limit framing effects as news frames become 
consistent or inconsistent with issue schemas” (p.411). He buttressed his argument with the 
finding that individuals were more likely to be influenced by the message frames that 
matched rather than deviated from their prior knowledge (Shen, 2004b). Parallel to Shen’s 
argument, Nelson and colleagues (1997) found that mediating effects were much stronger 
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among those people who were familiar with the framing contents. Likewise, Haider-Markel 
and Joslyn (2001) suggested that framing effects had powerful impact on audiences, 
especially when the issue frames were consistent with people’s political predispositions or 
when people lacked relevant knowledge about the issue. By the same token, framing effects 
could also be minimized due to strong resistance of firmly-held predispositions against 
inconsistent information (Chong & Druckman, 2007). 
2.5 Public Opinions on International Trade 
 Attitudes toward international trade include both economic and political dimensions, 
although the majority of past literature diverts academic attention to economic perspectives. 
Normally, the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) and Richardo-Viner (RV) frameworks are regarded as 
the most important models that explained individuals’ preferences over international trade 
policies, because international trade might affect individuals’ economic welfare through 
changing the value of different factors (the main factors that are put into production are labor, 
land, and cash investment) (Scheve & Slaughter, 2001a). The RV model assumes that all or at 
least some factors could not move freely from sector to sector; therefore, the factor values 
depend heavily on the industry of employment. As a result, international trade benefits all 
factors particularly relevant to export industries and hurts all factors involving import 
industries (Beaulieu, 2002; Scheve & Slaughter, 2001a). On the contrary, the HO model 
assumes that factors could move freely from sector to sector; hence, international trade 
benefits a country’s abundant factors (skilled workers and professionals in the United States) 
and hurts its scarce factors (unskilled workers) (Beaulieu, 2002; Scheve & Slaughter, 2001a). 
Based on U.S. factor endowment, the skilled labor among which is abundant (Leamer, 
1985), the HO model suggests that support for international trade comes mainly from these 
skilled workers, whereas less-skilled workers might prefer international trade barriers. On the 
contrary, the RV model anticipates support of international trade coming mainly from 
workers making a living in comparative-advantage industry sectors and opposition from 
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those serving in comparative-disadvantage sectors. Eugene Beaulieu (2002) endorsed this 
claim, arguing that preferences for trade policies might be influenced by both models. 
However, there have been more empirical evidences to support the hypothesis that 
individuals’ skill levels shape trade-policy preferences, and the hypothesis that employment 
industries influence policy preferences seems to be less popular (Daniels & von de Ruhr, 
2003; Scheve & Slaughter, 2001a). O’Rourke and Sinnott (2001) echoed this argument, 
claiming that in general, people with high skills were more likely to support international 
trade, and this association appeared more obvious in richer countries than in poorer countries 
due to comparative advantage of factor endowment. Mayda and Rodrik (2005) confirmed that 
within a country, individuals with more income preferred international cooperation with other 
countries, whereas those at the bottom of the social-economic status perceived international 
trade as detrimental to their economic welfare. 
Normally, education is used as a proxy measure of individual skill (Daniels & von de 
Ruhr, 2005; Scheve & Slaughter, 2001b). Scheve and Slaughter (2001a & 2001b) 
investigated the appropriateness of either education years or occupation wages as a proxy 
measure for individual skill and found that one could replace the other. Hiscox (2006) 
suggested that education levels strongly affected a person’s perception of international trade, 
with the well-educated or the highly skilled more supportive of international trade agreements. 
Even though it is generally agreed that education has powerful effects on people’s trade 
policy preferences, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006) argued that this effect was realized not 
through incremental accumulation of skills within the whole process of education, but 
through the social, cultural, and economic enlightenment associated with college education. 
Otherwise, they should have found noticeable difference in trade policy preferences between 
those who were currently working and those who were out of job or were in retirement. 
Religious belief and political ideology also play an important role in directing public 
opinion on foreign trade policies. Because religiosity, an important ethical element, has 
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powerful effects on not only the civic life of the people, but also their political activities 
(Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2003; Lam, 2006; McCleary & Barro, 2003), research 
exploring individuals’ international trade policy preferences should not neglect its influence. 
Lam (2006) suggested that religiosity did have the ability to shape people’s attitudes toward 
international trade, especially among wealthier individuals and those with higher education. 
He ascribed this to the economic well-being of the well educated and more skilled, who 
might give priority to other considerations instead of economic redistribution of international 
trade benefits. Daniels and Ruhr (2003, 2005) found that members of the three largest U. S. 
denominations: Catholics, Baptists, and Methodists, were less likely to endorse economic 
globalization. Mehanna (2002) found that people in countries with Protestantism dominating 
religious beliefs tended to be more positive and tolerant of international trade than people 
from Catholic or Muslim countries. The variations in religious beliefs may not only 
contribute to the different levels of anti-globalization attitudes across countries but also 
explain the varied economic globalization preferences within each country (O’Rourke & 
Sinnott, 2001). These religious beliefs are so ingrained in the American society that it is not 
hard to find evidence to show churches’ influence on American’s foreign policy preferences, 
especially when issues with extremely moral value are involved (Religion, 2006). 
Mayda and Rodrik (2005) found that there was a significantly negative relationship 
between national interests and trade preferences. The national interests in the form of 
patriotism and chauvinism are strongly associated with protectionist attitudes, and this further 
implies that economic elements are not the only factor that shapes public opinion on foreign 
trade (O’Rourke & Sinnott, 2001). According to a published encyclopedia, patriotism denotes 
“positive and supportive attitudes to a fatherland by individuals and groups. It covers such 
attitudes as pride in its achievements and culture, the desire to preserve its character and the 
basis of the culture, and identification with other members of the nation.” Nonetheless, 
chauvinism is “the extreme and often blind admiration of one’s country or proud belief that 
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one’s country is politically, morally, and militarily better than all others.3” Theoretically, 
nationalism (patriotism) is regarded to be positively associated with international cooperation, 
and chauvinism is often viewed as one factor to hinder globalization (Shulman, 2002). But, 
they were all found to relate weakly but negatively to economic liberalization support in 
Shulman’s study (2002).  
 International trade preferences are also significantly associated with people’s ideology, 
with those who have strong association with the political right in ideology being more likely 
to denounce economic globalization for deteriorating both the living and moral standards 
(Steger, 2002). A strong association also exists between gender and international trade policy 
preferences, with women more inclined to favor protectionist policies (Nelson et al., 1996; 
O’Rourke & Sinnott, 2001). Women who identify more strongly with Democratic Party and 
union members are found to be more likely to oppose trade globalization (Scheve & 
Slaughter, 2001a). Moreover, partisanship seems to be another predictor of trade preferences, 
with Republicans more likely to support protectionism than Democrats and Independents 
(Hiscox, 2006).   
2.6 Hypotheses and Research Question 
Before research questions and hypotheses predicting relationships between message 
frames, pre-existing schemas and people’s behavioral intentions are put forth, one more issue 
needs to be addressed. This study addresses attitudes toward international trade and 
individual investment intentions, rather than the actual investment behaviors. There is no 
denying that attitudes toward an issue or behavioral intentions could be a useful predictor of 
people’s actual behaviors. For instance, negative attitudes toward a president’s job 
performance may usher people to cast vote in congressional elections (Kernell, 1977), or 
consumers’ intentions to purchase is one of the two major factors that influence discretionary 
purchase (Curtin, 1982). Nevertheless, the attitudes or the intentions to purchase are 
                                                        
3 See Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, published by Longman Group Ltd. in 1978. 
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necessary, but not sufficient as a determinant of behaviors. The other critical factor that 
equally determines consumers’ discretionary purchase is their ability to purchase (Curtin, 
1982). Scholars like Festinger (1964), Wicker (1969) and many others have demonstrated an 
often weak relationship between attitudes or intentions and behaviors. 
Ajzen (1971), however, has suggested that a powerful association between intentions and 
behaviors may be possible, only in specific situations. This relationship would not hold under 
normal conditions, where a lot of intervening factors, for instance, new information, may 
influence attitudes toward an issue or individual behavioral intentions (Ajzen & Fishbeih, 
1974). Apart from people’s attitudes or intentions that could orientate their behaviors, such 
factors as motivations, social norms and situational happenings may also have powerful 
effects on people’s behaviors (Ehrlich, 1969; Triandis, 1971). For example, church attendance 
may be heavily influenced by situational happenings (Wicker, 1971), and the purchasing of 
industrial or durable goods may be more susceptive to the influence of such situational 
occurrences as price variation, promotion activities or introduction of new products (Sheth, 
1973). Ajzen (1996) put forth the theory of planned behavior to explain the consistency 
between attitudes, intentions and behaviors. He suggested that overt behaviors are not only 
oriented by people’s attitudes and social norms, for example, whether the persons would 
sense the approval of their actions from others, but also heavily guided by their confidence in 
their ability to take the action. Furthermore, if the attitudes toward an issue or the behavioral 
intentions are induced by firsthand experiences, such attitudes or behavioral intentions may 
be more valuable in predicting people’s subsequent actions. However, in this study, the 
highlight is placed merely on people’s attitudes toward international trade and their 
investment intentions without purposefully predicting people’s actual behaviors. 
Based on the literatures that have been reviewed, the following hypotheses and research 




H1: Respondents exposed to a pro-trade news frame will be more supportive of specific 
trade deals and, more generally, of international trade. 
H2: Respondents exposed to the ‘loss’ frame will be less supportive of the specific trade 
deals and, more generally, of international trade.  
H3: Pro-trade schematic respondents will be more supportive of the specific trade deals 
than anti-trade schematic respondents. 
H4: The effects of framing will be mediated by pre-existing attitudes toward free trade. 
Specifically, when exposed to economic news with pro-trade frame, pro-trade schematic 
respondents will be more likely to think the specific trade deals will help the United States. 
Likewise, when exposed to economic news with anti-trade frame, anti-trade schematic 
respondents will be more likely to think the specific trade deals will hurt the United States. 
 To date, no research has been found to contribute to the relationships among message 
frames in economic news, pre-existing schemas about trade and individual investment 
intentions, the following research question concerning individuals’ investment decisions in 
the forms of stock investment and relevant product purchasing is put forward for 
investigation: 
RQ: Do frames in communication and pre-existing schemas about free trade influence 
individual Americans’ investment intentions? Specifically, will message frames in economic 
news coverage of international trade and individuals’ pre-existing schemas about free trade 






3.1 Research Design 
The proposed hypotheses and research question were tested using a survey-based 
experiment with a 2 X 2 between-subject factorial design. The two manipulated factors were 
trade frames (pro-trade vs. anti-trade) and positive/negative frames (gains vs. losses). Two 
hundred sixty adults were recruited from LSU, churches and other public places to 
voluntarily participate in the study. They were offered a chance to win an 80GB iPod. 
Experiment participants first filled out a survey embedded with a series of open-ended 
questions measuring individuals’ preexisting attitudes toward free trade (See Lau, 1989; Shen, 
2004b). Responses to these questions were content analyzed and subsequently summed up to 
form individuals’ pre-existing schemas about free trade. The merit of this technique lies in the 
fact that by letting respondents respond to open-ended questions, respondents need not 
constrain their opinion to narrowly suggested answers (Baxter & Babbie, 2004). In addition, 
researchers could also figure out in this way how respondents weigh each consideration (See 
Lau, 1989; Shen, 2004b) and whether their sentiments toward those considerations are 
negative or positive. After a pretest survey, respondents were randomly assigned to one of the 
four framing conditions. In the course of the experiment, each subject read two news articles 
on international trade projects, and they were told that the news articles they read were 
photocopies of major newspaper articles. In order to avoid the possible order effect of the two 
news stories on respondents’ perceptions of the two international trade deals, the news stories 
were counter-balanced. Then, respondents were asked to read the articles at their normal 
speed. After they finished reading the articles, they each completed a posttest instrument and 
then were debriefed and thanked.  
3.2 Experimental Participants and Demographic Characters 
 Two hundred and sixty volunteers participated in the experiment. Among them were 36 
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LSU undergraduate students. Twelve of the participants came from a church. About 20 
volunteers were recruited from LSU campus on a day when a football game was held. 
Another 24 participants were parents of kids from either a public school or a private school. 
Four more participated in the experiment in a mall. The remaining 164 were mainly recruited 
from public libraries and bookstores in Baton Rouge.  
The average age for the participants was 36.7, with the youngest participant 17 years old 
and the eldest 84. More than half of the participants were female, reaching 141, accounting 
for 54.2 percent, and the remaining 119 participants were male, about 46 percent. Two 
hundred forty-five of the participants identified their race. Among them, 165 were white, 
accounting for 63.5 percent. Sixty two were African Americans, about 23.8 percent. Eight of 
the participants identified themselves as Hispanic and another 8 labeled themselves Asian, 3.1 
percent respectively. As for their educational background, 48 percent of the respondents 
received high education, 39.2 percent gained some college education or were currently 
studying in college, whereas the remaining 12.3 percent had no high education background. 
Of all the participants, 62.7 percent had jobs or ran their own businesses, while the remaining 
37.3 percent were students, laidoff workers and retired people. One hundred and one 
participants labeled themselves as Republican, about 39 percent. Eighty seven participants 
categorized themselves as Independents, accounting to 33.5 percent. The remaining 72 were 
Democrats, about 28 percent.  
The questionnaire also contained several other control variables that could contribute to 
subjects’ attitudes toward international trade deals, such as political ideology, measured on a 
7-point scale, ranging from 1(very conservative) to 7 (very liberal). The mean value of 
ideology for the respondents was 3.57 and its standard deviation 1.51. Income was measured 
in categorical scale (See Table 3). 
Table 3. Demographic Characteristics of Samples 
Age Range Number Percentage 




 21-30 79 30.4% 
 31-40 48 18.5% 
 41-50 41 15.8% 
 51-60 32 12.3% 
 Above 60 23 8.8% 
Household Income: Under $10,000 19 7.3% 
 $10,000-29,999 34 13.1% 
 $30,000-49,999 31 11.9% 
 $50,000-69,999 28 11.1% 
 $70,000-89,999 36 13.9% 
 $90,000-109,999 35 13.5% 
 $110,000+ 49 18.9% 
 Missing 27 10.4% 
Education High School Incomplete 4 1.5% 
 High School Grad 15 5.8% 
 Technical Training 13 5.0% 
 Some College 102 39.2% 
 College Grad 75 28.8% 
 Post-Graduate 51 19.6% 
 
3.3 Stimulus Material  
Two international trade projects were chosen for this study. One was Chrysler’s decision 
to cooperate with Chinese automaker Chery to produce mini-cars for the North American and 
European markets. The other concerned Hershey’s decision to transfer some of its production 
capacity to Mexico. These two issues have been widely discussed and covered by the major 
news media in the US and Canada, such as the New York Times, the International Herald 
Tribune, the Washington Post, the Associated Press State & Local Wire, Detroit Free Press, 
Patriot News, the Gazette and the Morning and Post. All four articles provided the same 
background information on current economic and financial burdens of each American 
company involved in the cooperation and potential benefits of the trade deals. The pro-trade 
or anti-trade frame was combined with either a gain or a loss frame respectively, thus forming 
four different framing conditions. 
 Similar to prior research (Nelson & Oxley, 1999; Shen & Edwards, 2005), all four 
articles constituted several paragraphs offering background information on the cooperative 
projects. Two more paragraphs were left for experimental conditions, with one appropriated 
for either an anti-trade or pro-trade frame and the other designed to establish either a loss or a 
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gain frame. The length and writing style were similar in all four articles to alleviate possible 
confounding variables. 
3.4 Measurement of Variables 
Pre-existing Schemas about Free International Trade. The key questions in this study 
concerned whether individuals’ pre-existing schemas about free trade would play an 
important role in directing individual responses to international trade projects, and whether 
the schemas may mediate frames in communication. In order to identify respondents’ 
preexisting schemas about free trade, respondents were asked an open-ended question about 
free trade. Participants were asked to provide their first four considerations that popped into 
their minds when they thought of free trade. Respondents were weighted such that the first 
response counted as four points, the second three points, the third two points, and the last 
response one point (See Lau 1989; Shen, 2004b). Moreover, each response was coded 
positive, negative or neutral according to whether that response was supportive of free trade, 
unsupportive of free trade, or stood somewhere in between. In order to facilitate identification 
of the direction of each response, two other open-ended questions were given as such: “Is 
there anything specific that makes you like free trade and what are they?” and “Is there 
anything specific that makes you dislike free trade and what are they?” If a respondent’s all 
four responses were supportive of free trade, he/she got ten points; if his/her responses were 
all against free trade, he/she got negative ten; if his/her first two responses were against free 
trade and the remaining two were for free trade, his/her score was negative four. In general, 
the final score for each respondent was the summation of every response, which ranged from 
-10 to +10. To assure reliability in coding the direction of these responses, a second 
independent coder also coded participants’ responses to the open-ended questions. Intercoder 
reliability was .86 with Scott’s pi. There were 260 people participating in this experiment. 
Among them, 82 were anti-trade schematic, accounting to 31.5 percent; 50 of them were 
neutral; and the remaining 128 pro-trade schematic, reaching 49.2 percent.  
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Issue Attitudes and Investment Intentions. After reading the news stories, participants 
were asked about their attitudes and investment intention regarding each specific project. The 
first question asked “Would you say this specific trade deal is likely to hurt the United States 
or help the United States?” Responses were coded such that 1 indicated that the agreement 
would hurt the United States a great deal and 7 indicated the deal would help the United 
States a great deal. The second question asked whether, if given the opportunity, they would 
invest in these companies engaged in international trade deals in the forms of buying the 
stocks or products. The questions were anchored by 1 for not at all likely and 7 for very likely. 
Respondents were also asked about whether they thought international trade in generally had 
helped or hurt the United States. Responses ranged from 1 indicating that international trade 
had hurt the United States a great deal to 7 which indicated that international trade had helped 
the United States a great deal. Of all 251 respondents who answered this question, 115 
indicated that international trade had helped the United States, amounting to 45.8%. Seventy 
one claimed they were neutral, about 28 percent and the remaining 65 people thought 
international trade had hurt the United States, reaching 25.9 percent. The items on 
international trade are similar to those used in prior studies (See ICPSR4137 Global Views 
2004: American Public Opinion and Foreign Policy). 
3.5 Control Variables 
In addition to the above-labeled measures, the questionnaire contained several other 
variables that could also be the sources of subjects’ attitudes toward and investment intention 
about these international trade projects. 
Nationalism and Chauvinism. Because patriotism and chauvinism were significantly 
related to protectionist attitudes in virtually all countries, techniques to identify nationalism 
and chauvinism utilized by O’Roukre and Sinnott (2001) were adopted in this study. In order 
to investigate whether patriotism and chauvinism had any influence on individuals’ foreign 
trade policy preferences, and whether they functioned in the same or opposite directions, 
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questions concerning individuals’ attitudes toward their own country, their country’s interest, 
customs and traditions, were included in the pretest. The same items adopted in ISSP 
National Identity Survey were used in the pretest. The same principal components analysis of 
participants’ responses as what O’Roukre and Sinnott did (2001) was conducted in this study 
and yielded two identical factors. As shown in Table 4, the first factor concerned individual 
Americans’ sense of love of and pride in one’s own country and thus was labeled Nationalism. 
The second factor identified a narrow or extreme sense of superiority of one’s own country 
over foreign countries and consequently was labeled Chauvinism.  
Table 4: Factor Analysis of Nationalism and Chauvinism Items 
Statements Factor 1 Factor 2 
Generally speaking, the United States is a better country than most other 
countries. 
.884 .042 
The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like 
the United States. 
.817 .167 
I would rather be an American citizen than of any other country in the world. .833 -.005 
It is impossible for people who do not share U.S. customs and traditions to 
become fully American. 
-.124 .679 
People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong. .131 .736 
The United States should follow its own interests, even if this leads to conflicts 
with other nations. 
.399 .603 
It is important to have been born in the United States to be fully American. .063 .742 
Percent variance (%) 33.4 27.8 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization 
 
Scores of Nationalism or Chauvinism were calculated by adding responses across the 
relevant subsets of items identified in the factor analysis. Nationalism thus ranged from 3 to 
21, with the mean value reaching 15.3 and standard deviation 4.21, while Chauvinism ran 
from 4 to 28, with the mean value being 11.8 and standard deviation 5.06. Because 
Nationalism and Chauvinism were both multidimensional constructs and their natures were 
hard to capture with a single question item, hence, it seemed more sensible to use multiple 
question items to investigate the essence of their underlying natures (O’Roukre & Sinnott, 
2001). According to the mean score of each factor, this subject pool seemed to be more 





Religiosity. Religiosity is regarded as an important factor in driving individuals’ attitudes 
toward international trade (Mockabee et al., 2001). Normally, religious attendance has been 
regularly used as a proxy measure of religiosity, and individuals who have profound religious 
beliefs tend to go to churches more often than those who have less religious beliefs. However, 
this variable seems to capture more of the characteristics of religious participation rather than 
the essence of real religious beliefs. Furthermore, the less frequency in religious-service 
attendance does not necessarily indicate that these people have less faith in religion than 
those regular church goers. Scholars like Barkan (2006), Mockabee et al. (2001), and 
Williams (1994) solved this problem by treating religiosity as a multidimensional concept 
constituting both subjective and behavioral dimensions. They suggested that a specific index 
could come into use by encapsulating both the behavioral and subjective dimensions into one 
scale. In other words, a scale of religiosity could be built by adding weighted behavioral 
dimensions and subjective factors together. Nevertheless, Mockabee et al. (2001) found that a 
weighted scale does not outweigh an uncorrected scale in predicting religiosity, and a 
standard scale with summation of both subjective factor (religious guidance) and such 
behavioral dimensions as attendance, prayer, and scripture reading might work fine under all 
conditions. Guided with this principle, four questions were asked in the pretest for the 
purpose of forming a religiosity index stressing religious service attendance, scripture reading, 
prayer and religious guidance. This religiosity scale ranged from 4 to 20, with the mean score 
of the respondents located at 13.3 and standard deviation being 4.19 (Cronbach’s alpha .82). 
Because the mean score of the respondents in terms of this religiosity scale was 13.3, higher 






4.1 Findings for Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1. The first hypothesis suggests that respondents exposed to a pro-trade news 
frame will be more supportive of specific trade deals and, in general, of international trade. 
The descriptive statistics showed that the mean score with respect to evaluation of the 
automaking-cooperation for respondents reading the news story with an anti-trade frame was 
3.59, while the mean value for their counterparts reading the same news story but with a 
pro-trade frame was 4.03, rendering a difference of .44 (See Figure 1). A t test was conducted 
for preliminary investigation about whether the gap as large as .44 was significantly different 
from zero, without considering other covariants that could be sources of the difference. The 
statistical results showed that a gap as this large was significantly different from zero (t = 































Figure 1: Mean Values for Evaluating Car Deal between Anti and Pro-trade Frames 
 
A hierarchical regression was then run to test this hypothesis, as well as to demonstrate 
the overall relationships between respondents’ evaluations of the car deal and each predictor 
variables. In model one, such demographic characteristics as age, gender, education, 
employment and union membership, which past studies have identified as influential 
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determinants of individual Americans’ attitudinal responses toward international trade were 
put into the regression for consideration. In model two, general orientation factors that may 
lead to variation in individual Americans’ perception about international trade—nationalism, 
chauvinism, party, ideology and religion were added to the regression. Anti/pro-trade frame 
and loss/gain frame, the experimental stimuli, joined in the regression in model three, and 
respondents’ pre-existing schemas about free trade and their predispositions about 
international trade were added to the regression in model four.  
Table 5. Hierarchical Regression of Subject Attitudes toward Car Deal  
(in Standardized Coefficient: Beta) 









Age .129 .114 .104 .090 
Gender -.086 -.091 -.100 -.121* 
Education -.037 -.030 -.033 -.016 
Employment -.224*** -.224*** -.220*** -.154** 
Union .161* .162* .147* .119* 
Nationalism  .001 .00 -.025 
Chauvinism  .037 .025 .077 
Party   .007 .012 .016 
Ideology  -.074 -.070 -.051 
Religion  -.024 -.017 .028 
Anti/Pro-Trade Frame   -.100 -.114* 
Loss/Gain Frame   -.056 -.065 
Pre-existing Free Trade 
Schemas 
   .204*** 
International Trade 
Attitude 
   .306*** 
Interaction: Anti/pro * 
Free Trade Schema 
    
R2 Change .101*** .007 .012 .160*** 
* p < .05     ** p < .01    *** p< .001   
 
The statistical results showed that the experimental stimulus: anti/pro-trade frame, when 
first added into the regression in model three, did not demonstrate any influence on 
respondents’ evaluations of the car deal (t = -1.582, d.f. = 12, p = .115), even when both the 
demographic predictor variables and general orientation variables were kept in statistical 
control. But when respondents’ pre-existing schemas about free trade and international trade 
were added into the regression in model four, that is, when the influence of these two 
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pre-existing schemas on the relationship between respondents’ evaluations of the card deal 
and the experimental stimuli anti/pro-trade frame was partialed out, the effects of message 
frame showed up. Respondents reading the automaking news story with an anti-trade frame 
were indeed less supportive of this specific trade deal than those exposed to a pro-trade news 
frame (t = -1.983, d.f. = 14, p = .049). Keeping all other factors in control, respondents 
exposed to the anti-trade news frame rated the automaking project about .114 Beta points 
lower than those respondents reading the same news story but with a pro-trade news frame 
(See Table 5). The general orientation predictors had no effects on people’s perception of this 
international trade cooperation. Employment and union membership were the demographic 
predictor variables that orientated people’s perception of the car deal, and their effects 
continued from model one through model four. Respondents with jobs seemed to evaluate the 
car deal less positively than respondents without jobs (t = -2.606, d.f. = 14, p = .010), whereas 
nonunion members seemed to be more enthusiastic about the trade deal than union members 
(t = 2.025, d.f. = 14, p = .044). Gender seemed to demonstrate its influence on people’s 
perception about the car deal when pre-existing schemas were added to the regression in 
model four for investigation, with men less likely to endorse such an international 

































Figure 2: Mean Values for Evaluating Chocolate Deal between Anti and Pro-trade Frames 
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Similarly, the mean score with respect to evaluation of the chocolate deal for respondents 
reading an anti-trade frame news story was 3.35, while the mean value for those respondents 
reading the same news story but with a pro-trade frame rises to 3.77, generating a difference 
of .42 (See Figure 2). The preliminary statistical analysis using a t test without considering 
the influence from other predictor variables showed that a gap as large as .42 was 
significantly different from zero (t = -2.314, d.f. = 258, p = .021). 
Table 6. Hierarchical Regression of Subject Attitudes toward Chocolate Deal 
(in Standardized Coefficient: Beta) 









Age .154* .152* .146* .129* 
Gender -.069 -.079 -.086 -.103 
Education -.033 -.023 -.025 -.005 
Employment -.149* -.146* -.140* -.079 
Union .116 .106 .092 .063 
Nationalism  -.022 -.021 -.048 
Chauvinism  .052 .041 .100 
Party   -.085 -.083 -.078 
Ideology  .005 .012 .033 
Religion  .034 .024 .017 
Anti/Pro Trade   -.108 -.123* 
Loss/Gain   -.006 -.013 
Pre-existing Free Trade 
Schemas 
   .236*** 
International Trade 
Attitude 
   .262*** 
Interaction: Anti/Pro * 
Free Trade Schema 
    
R2 Change .058* .010 .011 .149*** 
* p < .05     ** p < .01    *** p< .001   
 
A similar hierarchical regression was also conducted to test this hypothesis. When the 
experimental stimulus anti/pro-trade frame was first put into the regression, without 
statistically controlling for the influence from the pre-existing schemas about free trade and 
international trade, there was no relationship between respondents’ evaluations of the 
chocolate deal and the anti/pro-trade frame. After adjusting all other covariants, especially 
respondents’ free-trade schemas and international trade predispositions, respondents reading 
the chocolate news story with an anti-trade frame were less supportive of the chocolate deal 
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than those respondents receiving a pro-trade news frame (t = -2.070, d.f. = 14, p = .040). In 
other words, when keeping other factors in control, respondents exposed to the anti-trade 
news frame rated the chocolate project about .123 Beta points lower than those respondents 
reading the same news story but with a pro-trade news frame (see Table 6). Age was the 
single demographic variable that could help predict respondents’ evaluations of the chocolate 
deal, with one-year increase in age leading to .129 Beta points higher in the evaluation of the 
chocolate deal (t = 1.979, d.f. = 14, p = .049). Employment demonstrated indirect effects on 
respondents’ evaluations of this trade deal. 
As for the second part of the first hypothesis that the pro/anti-trade frames may have 
effects on respondents’ attitudes toward international trade in general, the descriptive 
statistics demonstrated that the mean score concerning the evaluation of international trade in 
general for respondents exposed to a pro-trade news frame was 4.45, while the average value 
for those exposed to the anti-trade frame was 4.27, merely .18 apart. A t test without 
statistically controlling all other covariants showed that the gap as large as .18 was not 
































Figure 3: Mean Values for Evaluating International Trade between Anti and Pro-trade Frames 
 
A similar hierarchical regression was performed to investigate whether this relationship 
existed while statistically keeping all other variables in control. The statistical results showed 
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that respondents exposed to the anti-trade news frame were not more likely to think 
international trade had hurt the United States than respondents exposed to the pro-trade news 
frame (t = -.587, d.f. = 14, p = .558; see Table 7). Therefore, the first hypothesis was 
supported under the condition of the two specific trade deals, but rejected in terms of the 
attitudes toward international trade in general. 
Table 7. Hierarchical Regression of Subject Attitudes toward International Trade 
(in Standardized Coefficient: Beta)  









Age .062 .085 .083 .068 
Gender .001 .003 .001 -.034 
Education .093 .096 .095 .102 
Employment -.112 -.107 -.106 .008 
Union .071 .075 .072 .040 
Nationalism  -.037 -.037 -.075 
Chauvinism  -.011 -.013 .046 
Party  .021 .023 .020 
Ideology  .010 .010 .034 
Religion  -.094 -.094 -.033 
Anti/Pro-trade Frame   -.014 -.032 
Loss/Gain Frame   -.017 -.028 
Pre-existing Schemas of 
Free Trade 
   .212*** 
International Trade 
Attitudes 
   .492*** 
R2 Change .033 .013 .000 .320*** 






























Figure 4: Mean Values for Evaluating Car Deal between Loss and Gain Frames 
 
Hypothesis 2. The second hypothesis predicts that respondents exposed to the loss frame 
will be less supportive of the specific trade deals and, more generally, of international trade. 
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The descriptive statistics showed that the mean score in terms of the car deal evaluation for 
respondents reading the news story in the loss condition was 3.67, while the average value for 
respondents reading the same news story but in the gain situation was 3.95, resulting in a 
difference of .28 (See Figure 4). The preliminary statistics using a t test without statistically 
controlling all other covariants showed that a gap as large as .28 was not significantly 
different from zero (t = -1.477, d.f. = 258, p = .141).  
As for the Chocolate deal, the descriptive statistics showed that the mean score in terms 
of people’s chocolate deal evaluation for respondents reading the news story in the loss 
condition was 3.51, while the average score for respondents reading the same news story but 
in the gain situation was 3.61, resulting in a difference of .10 (See Figure 5). The preliminary 
statistics using a t test without keeping constant all other predictor variables showed that a 


































Figure 5: Mean Values for Evaluating Chocolate Deal between Loss and Gain Frames 
A hierarchical regression was then run to investigate whether the loss/gain frame had any 
effect on people’s perception of the two specific trade deals under the condition with all other 
variables kept constant. The statistical results (see Table 5 and Table 6) showed that relative 
to the respondents reading a gain-frame news story about the automaking cooperation, 
respondents reading the same news story but in a loss conduction did not evaluate the car deal 
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significantly lower (t = -1.151, d.f. = 14, p = .251). This no-effect scenario also held true for 
the chocolate outsourcing. Respondents administered under the loss frame did not bear more 
negative feeling toward the trade deal than their counterparts who read the news story framed 
in a gain condition.(t =.-.224, d.f. = 14, p = .823). As to respondents’ attitudes toward 
international trade in general, the loss/gain frame variation seemed to have no effect either (t 
=-.520, d.f. = 14, p = .604, see Table 7). Hence, this research hypothesis was rejected. 
Hypothesis 3. H3 predicts that pre-existing schemas about free trade will play a powerful 
impact on respondents’ perception about these two trade deals. Specifically, pro-trade 
schematic respondents will be more supportive of the specific trade deals than anti-trade 
schematic respondents. A simple Linear regression was conducted to check preliminarily the 
relationship between respondents’ pre-existing schemas about free trade and their respective 
evaluation of the car deal and chocolate deal. The statistical results showed that people’s 
pre-existing schemas about free trade, even under the condition that all other covariants were 
not controlled statistically, had powerful effects on their perception of both the trade deals (t 
=.5.091, d.f. = 1, p = .000 for car deal; t =.5.141, d.f. = 1, p = .000 for chocolate deal). Model 
four in both hierarchical regressions (see Table 5 and Table 6) displayed these relationships 
when the influence of all other covariants was partialed out. No matter which trade deal it 
involved, the car cooperation or the chocolate outsourcing, pro-trade schematic respondents 
were indeed more likely to endorse these two international trade deals than anti-trade 
schematic respondents (t = 3.359, d.f. = 14, p = .001; t = 3.750, d.f. = 14, p = .000). As 
respondents increased their free-trade pre-existing schema level by one point, they would rate 
the automaking deal .204 and the chocolate deal .236 Beta points higher. Thus hypothesis 3 
was supported (see Table 5 and Table 6). 
Hypothesis 4. H4 predicts that the effects of framing will be mediated by respondents’ 
pre-existing schemas of free trade. In other words, when exposed to economic news with a 
pro-trade frame, pro-trade schematic respondents will be more likely to think the two specific 
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trade deals will help the United States. In the same vein, when exposed to economic news 
with an anti-trade frame, anti-trade schematic respondents will be less likely to think the two 
specific trade deals will help the United States. Multiple-line charts were used to help 
investigate whether the hypothetical interaction effect existed in both cases. The charts 
seemed to suggest that no such effects existed in either of the two trade deals (see Figure 6 
and Figure 7).  









































Figure 6 Mediating Effect of Pre-existing Free-trade Schema on Anti/Pro-trade Frames for 
Car Deal 










































Figure 7 Mediating effect of Pre-existing Free-trade Schemas on Anti/Pro-trade Frames for 
Chocolate Deal 
 
A new predictor variable pre-existing free-trade schema*anti/pro-trade frame was added 
into the original hierarchical regressions for respondents’ perception of both the car deal and 
chocolate deal as model five, and the statistical results showed that the hypothetical 
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mediating relationship between pre-existing free-trade schema and anti/pro-trade frame did 
not exist for both the case (t = .624, d.f. = 15, p = .533 for car deal; t = -.341, d.f. = 15, p 
= .733 for chocolate deal; Check Table A and Table B in Appendix A for complete regression 
results). Hence, this hypothesis was rejected.  
 
4.2 Findings for Research Question 
The research question aims to examine whether message frames as well as pre-existing 
schemas about free trade have any effect on individual investment intentions, specifically 
their intentions to buy stocks or products of the companies involved in the trade deals. 
Attention was first paid to people’s intentions to purchase Chrysler cars and Hershey 
chocolate bars. 
Chrysler Car Purchasing Intention. Will different message frames and pre-existing 
schemas influence respondents’ willingness to buy Chrysler cars? The descriptive statistics 
showed that respondents exposed to the anti-trade frame scored averagely at 3.08 in terms of 
their intention to purchase Chrysler cars, while the average score for respondents in the 
pro-trade frame reached 4.22, leaving a gap of 1.14 points. The car-purchasing intention gap 
between respondents exposed to the loss frame and corresponding counterparts receiving a 
gain frame was even larger: 2.54, with the mean score for loss-frame readers located at 2.38 
and the average value for gain-frame readers at 4.92. A preliminary analysis with t test was 
performed without considering the influence of all other predictor variables, and the 
statistical results showed that the anti/pro-trade frame did not have any effect on respondents’ 
Chrysler car purchasing intentions (t = -.877, d.f. = 258, p = .381); but the loss/gain frame had 
marginal effect on individuals’ Chrysler-car purchasing intentions (t = -1.967, d.f. = 258, p 
= .051).  
A hierarchical regression was then performed to investigate whether the message frames 
had any powerful effects on respondents’ Chrysler car purchasing intentions when all other 
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covariants were kept statistically in constant. The regression results showed that respondents 
who read the news story about Chrysler-Chery cooperation with an anti-trade frame were 
indeed less likely to express their intentions to purchase Chrysler cars (t = -2.192, d.f. = 15, p 
= .030). The car purchasing intentions seemed to be similarly influenced by the loss/gain 
frame variation. Respondents who read the loss-frame news story were less likely to have the 
intention to purchase Chrysler cars compared to those who read the same news story but with 
a gain frame (t = -2.084, d.f. = 15, p = .038; See Table 8). Nevertheless, the pre-existing 
schemas about free-trade seemed to have no effects on respondents’ intention to buy Chrysler 
cars (t = .1.242, d.f. = 15, p = .216). Neither did respondents’ pre-existing attitudes about 
international trade (t = .515, d.f. = 15, p = .607). Nevertheless, relative to respondents with 
less annual income, respondents with more annual income seemed to have less intention to 
purchase Chrysler cars (t = -2.201, d.f. = 15, p = .029). What is more, respondents highly 
attached to Democratic ideology were more likely to express their intention to purchase 
Chrysler cars (t = 3.466, d.f. = 15, p = .001; See Table 8). Education seemed to have an 
indirect effect on people’s intention to purchase Chrysler cars. 
Table 8. Hierarchical Regression of Subject Intentions to Purchase Chrysler Car 
(in Standardized Coefficient: Beta)  









Age .017 .015 -.005 -.012 
Gender -.106 -.100 -.118 -.119 
Education -.142* -.118 -.122 -.115 
Income -.153* -.138 -.158* -.157* 
Employment .095 .080 .099 .111 
Union .058 .046 .022 .014 
Nationalism  .126 .127 .120 
Chauvinism  .113 .094 .113 
Party  -.120 -.109 -.107 
Ideology  .306* .299*** .302*** 
Religion  .050 .046 .058 
Anti/Pro-trade Frame   -.138* -.145* 
Loss/Gain Frame   -.136* -.136* 
Pre-existing Schemas of 
Free Trade 
   .086 
International Trade 
Attitudes 
   .036 
R2 Change .064* .063* .034* .010 
*p < .05     **p < .01     ***p < .001 
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Hershey Chocolate Bar Purchasing Intentions. With respect to the intention to buy 
Hershey chocolate bars, descriptive statistics showed that respondents exposed to the 
pro-trade frame scored at a average value of 4.91, while respondents exposed to the anti-trade 
frame scored .30 lower, at a mean value of 4.61. Respondents exposed to the loss frame had a 
mean score of 4.77 in terms of their intention to purchase Hershey chocolate bars, while the 
average value in terms of chocolate-bar purchasing intentions for respondents exposed to a 
gain frame was 4.67. A preliminary statistical analysis with t test was performed to check 
whether the anti/pro-trade frame and the loss/gain frame had any influence on respondents’ 
chocolate bar purchasing intentions, without considering the influence from all other 
covariants. The results showed that neither the message frame (anti/pro-trade frame and 
loss/gain frame) had any effect on respondents’ intention to purchase Hershey chocolate bars 
(t = -1.343, d.f. = 254, p = .180 for the anti/pro-trade frame; t = .051, d.f. = 254, p = .960 for 
the loss/gain frame) 
A hierarchical regression was conducted and the statistical results demonstrated further 
that neither the anti/pro-trade frame nor the loss/gain frame could add any knowledge to the 
prediction of people’s intentions to purchase Hershey chocolate bars when statistically 
controlling all the covariants in the regression (t = -1.439, d.f. = 15, p = .152 for the 
anti/pro-trade frame; t = -.386, d.f. = 15, p = .700 for the loss/gain frame). Similarly, the 
pre-existing schemas about free trade had no effect on people’s chocolate bar purchasing 
intentions (t = 1.705, d.f. = 15, p = .090). However, gender seemed to have powerful effects 
on people’s intentions to purchase Hershey chocolate bars, with women more likely to harbor 
the intention to buy the chocolate bars (t = 2.497, d.f. = 15, p = .013). Interestingly, people 
who had favorable attitudes toward international trade expressed more intense willingness to 
purchase chocolate bars than those who disfavored international trade (t = 2.379, d.f. = 15, p 




Table 9. Hierarchical Regression of Subject Intentions to Purchase Hershey Chocolate Bars 
(in Standardized Coefficient: Beta)  









Age .047 .053 .046 .034 
Gender -.130 -.150* -.159* -.176* 
Education .013 .025 .023 .031 
Income .130 -.005 -.013 -.012 
Employment -.101 -.097 -.085 -.045 
Union .088 .085 .073 .060 
Nationalism  .096 .097 .081 
Chauvinism  .040 .034 .062 
Party  -.050 -.050 -.050 
Ideology  .048 .051 .059 
Religion  -.075 -.070 -.028 
Anti/Pro-trade Frame   -.082 -.099 
Loss/Gain Frame   -.021 -.026 
Pre-existing Schemas of 
Free Trade 
   .123 
International Trade 
Attitudes 
   .170* 
R2 Change .041 .017 .007 .053** 
*p < .05     **p < .01     ***p < .001 
 
Chrysler Stock Purchasing Intentions. With respect to respondents’ intentions to buy 
Chrysler stocks, the descriptive statistics showed that the average value of intentions to 
purchase Chrysler stocks for respondents exposed to the anti-trade frame was 3.03, while the 
mean score for respondents exposed to the pro-trade frame was 3.70, leaving a difference 
of .67. Meanwhile, the average value in terms of Chrysler-stock purchasing intention for 
respondents exposed to the loss frame was 3.31, while the average score for respondents 
reading the news story with a gain frame was 3.42, generating a gap of .11. To generate a 
preliminary idea whether these two gaps were significantly different from zero, a t test was 
performed without putting all the covariants into consideration. The statistical results showed 
that respondents reading the car cooperation news story with the anti-trade frame were less 
likely to harbor the intention of investing in Chrysler stocks (t = -2.788, d.f. = 251, p = .006). 
However, respondents reading the car cooperation news story with the loss frame did not 
possess significantly different intention from their counterparts reading the same news story 
but with a gain frame in terms of investing in Chrysler-stock investment (t = -.426, d.f. = 351, 
p = .670). 
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Table 10. Hierarchical Regression of Subject Intentions to Purchase Chrysler Stocks 
(in Standardized Coefficient: Beta) 









Age -.035 -.057 -.071 -.080 
Gender -.020 -.018 -.042 -.069 
Education .018 .022 .019 .024 
Income -.020 -.017 -.040 -.036 
Employment -.151* -.160* -.130 -.079 
Union .003 .005 -.027 -.042 
Nationalism  .129 .132 .111 
Chauvinism  .033 .011 .033 
Party  -.013 -.014 -.014 
Ideology  .087 .097 .103 
Religion  .072 .082 .121 
Anti/Pro-trade Frame   -.200** -.216** 
Loss/Gain Frame   -.066 -.071 
Pre-existing Schemas of 
Free Trade 
   .087 
International Trade 
Attitudes 
   .250*** 
R2 Change .029 .021 .039* .078*** 
*p < .05     **p < .01     ***p < .001 
 
A hierarchical regression was performed with all other relevant variables kept constant. 
The statistical results showed that respondents exposed to the pro-trade news frame were 
more willing to buy Chrysler stocks than respondents exposed to the anti-trade news frame (t 
= 3.20, d.f. = 15, p = .002). However, respondents reading the news story with the gain frame 
did not harbor stronger intentions to purchase Chrysler stocks than respondents reading the 
same news story but with the loss frame (t = -1.081, d.f. = 15, p = .281). Those pro-trade 
schematic respondents did not distinguish themselves from anti-trade schematic respondents 
with respect to their intention to buy Chrysler stocks (t = 1.237, d.f. = 15, p = .218; see Table 
10). Nevertheless, respondents’ attitudes towards international trade did have a significant 
effect on their Chrysler stock purchasing intentions, with one point increase in people’s 
feeling about international trade leading to an increase of .250 Beta points in terms of 
people’s intentions to purchase Chrysler stocks (t = 3.577, d.f. = 15, p = .0005; see Table 10). 
The demographic variable employment seemed to have indirect effects on respondents’ 




Hershey Stock Purchasing Intentions. The mean value of Hershey-stock purchasing 
intention for respondents administered under the anti-trade frame was 3.28, .34 lower than 
that for the respondents administered under the pro-trade frame (3.62). The mean value gap in 
terms of respondents’ Hershey stock purchasing intentions between respondents exposed to 
the gain frame (3.50) and their counterparts exposed to the loss frame (3.39) was even smaller, 
merely .11 points. A t test without considering all the covariants offered a preliminary 
understanding of the relationship between the message frames and people’s Hershey stock 
purchasing intentions, and the statistical results showed that neither the anti/pro-trade frame 
nor the loss/gain frame had any effects on people’s intentions to purchase Hershey stocks (t 
=-1.399, d.f. = 252, p = .163 for the anti/pro-trade frame; t = -.453, d.f. = 252, p = .651 for the 
loss/gain frame). 
Table 11. Hierarchical Regression of Subject Intentions to Purchase Hershey Stocks 
(in Standardized Coefficient: Beta) 









Age -.008 -.008 -.014 -.031 
Gender .004 -.006 -.016 -.019 
Education -.072 -.065 -.069 -.057 
Income .005 -.022 -.031 -.031 
Employment -.116 -.115 -.106 -.079 
Union -.011 -.010 -.021 -.037 
Nationalism  .051 .005 .043 
Chauvinism  .021 .013 .048 
Party  -.002 -.002 .000 
Ideology  -.012 -.010 .002 
Religion  -.042 -.045 -.016 
Anti/Pro-trade Frame   -.056 -.071 
Loss/Gain Frame   .059 -.060 
Pre-existing Schemas of 
Free Trade 
   .162* 
International Trade 
Attitudes 
   .093 
R2 Change .021 .005 .006 .041* 
*p < .05     **p < .01     ***p < .001 
 
A hierarchical regression was performed to see whether these mean value gaps were 
significantly different from zero with all the covariants kept in statistical control. The 
statistical results showed that neither the anti/pro-trade news frame nor the loss/gain frame 
had any effects on respondents’ intentions to buy Hershey stocks (t = -1.002, d.f. = 15, p 
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= .317 for anti/pro-trade frame; t = -.862, d.f. = 15, p = .390 for loss/gain frame). However, 
respondents’ pre-existing schemas about free trade seemed to have certain effects on their 
Hershey-stock purchasing intentions, with one point increase in the pre-existing schema 
index leading to an increase of .162 Beta points regarding their intentions to purchase 
Hershey stocks (t = 2.19, d.f. = 15, p = .030; see Table 11).  
Chinese Automaking Stock Purchasing Intentions. With respect to the intension to 
purchase Chinese automobile stocks, the average value for respondents exposed to the news 
story with the pro-trade frame reached 4.10, while the average value for respondents exposed 
to the anti-trade frame was 3.55, .55 points apart. However, the mean value gap with respect 
to their intention to purchase Chinese automaking stocks between respondents reading a news 
story with the loss frame (3.77) and their counterparts reading the same news story but with a 
gain frame (3.89) was not that big, merely .12 points. A preliminary t test analysis without 
partialing out the influence from all the covariants showed that the anti/pro-trade frame did 
have powerful effects on respondents’ intentions to purchase Chinese automaking stocks (t = 
-2.231, d.f. = 243, p = .027). But the loss/gain frame had no effects on their intentions to 
invest in Chinese autmakaing industries. 
A hierarchical regression results confirmed that when the influence from allother 
covariants were considered, respondents administered under the pro-trade frame were more 
likely to have the intention to purchase Chinese automobile stocks, compared to respondents 
exposed to the news story with the anti-trade frame (t = 2.499, d.f. = 15, p = .013; see Table 
12). Nevertheless, there was no difference in terms of Chinese automaking-stock purchasing 
intention between respondents reading the news story with the gain frame and those reading 
the same news story but with the loss frame (t = -1.033, d.f. = 15, p = .303). Likewise, 
pre-existing free-trade schemas did not have any effect on people’s Chinese stock purchasing 
intention (t = 1.259, d.f. = 15, p = .210). However, those people with higher education were 
less likely to purchase Chinese automaking stocks. (t = -1.980, d.f. = 15, p = .049), and those 
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people with favorable feeling toward international trade preferred to purchase Chinese 
automaking stocks (t = 2.276, d.f. = 15, p = .024; see Table 12). 
Table 12. Hierarchical Regression of Subject Intentions to Purchase Chinese Automaking 
Stocks (in Standardized Coefficient: Beta) 









Age -.058 -.058 -.072 -.077 
Gender -.048 -.060 -.082 -.093 
Education -.126 -.130 .-137 -.149* 
Income -.083 -.110 .-131 -.125 
Employment -.021 -.013 .014 .055 
Union .056 .058 .038 .027 
Nationalism  .002 .008 -.007 
Chauvinism  -.047 -.062 -.037 
Party  .027 .024 .022 
Ideology  -.148 -.142 -.138 
Religion  -.054 -.052 -.024 
Anti/Pro-trade Frame   -.161 -.175* 
Loss/Gain Frame   -.069 -.071 
Pre-existing Schemas of 
Free Trade 
   .092 
International Trade 
Attitudes 
   .165* 
R2 Change .047 .015 .028 .040* 
*p < .05     **p < .01     ***p < .001 
 
Given the chance that respondents have already purchased Chrysler or Hershey stocks, 
what will happen to their investment strategies after reading the two news stories? In order to 
check the consequences, respondents were asked “Now assuming you had Chrysler stock, 
what would you be most likely to do: keep the stocks, buy additional stock, or sell the 
stocks?” Since the answers were categorical, the first two alternative answers were lumped 
together as 1 and the third answer sell the stocks was recoded as 0.  
Intentions to Keep or Sell Chrysler Stocks. Descriptive statistics results showed that 
the mean value in terms of the intention to keep or sell Chrysler stocks for respondents 
reading the automaking news story with the pro-trade frame was .732, while the mean value 
for respondents reading the news story but with the anti-trade frame was .568. The 
preliminary statistical analysis with cross-tabulation suggested that the anti/pro-trade frame 




Table 13. Crosstabulation of Keep or Sell Chrysler Stocks * Anti/Pro-trade Frames 
Keep or Sell Stocks  Anti-trade Pro-trade Total 
0 (Sell Stocks) 54 (43.2%) 34 (26.8%) 88 (34.9%) 
1 (Keep Stocks) 71 (56.8%) 93 (73.2%) 164 (65.1%) 
Total 125 (100%) 127 (100%) 252 (100%) 
X2 = 7.481, d.f. = 1, p = .006 
 
The average value with respect to people’s intention to keep or sell Chrysler stocks for 
respondents reading the automaking news story with the loss frame was .612, while the mean 
value for respondents reading the news story but with the gain frame was .691. The 
preliminary statistical analysis with cross-tabulation demonstrated that that the loss/gain 
frame did not have any effect on people’s willingness to keep or sell Chrysler stocks (See 
Table 14).  
Table 14. Crosstabulation of Keep or Sell Chrysler Stocks * Loss/Gain Frame 
Keep or Sell Stocks  Anti-trade Pro-trade Total 
0 (Sell Stocks) 38 (30.9%) 50 (38.8%) 88 (34.9%) 
1 (Keep Stocks) 85 (69.1%) 79 (61.2%) 164 (65.1%) 
Total 123 (100%) 129 (100%) 252 (100%) 
X2 =1.714, d.f. = 1, p = .190 
 
Since the dependent variable was categorical, a hierarchical Logistic regression was 
conducted. The statistical results further confirmed that the loss/gain frame did not have any 
effect on individual Americans’ intention to keep or sell Chrysler stocks (Wald = .469, d.f. = 1, 
p = .808; See Table 15). However, the pro-trade/anti-trade frame did have a significant effect 
on people’s intention to keep or sell Chrysler stocks (Wald = 10.708, d.f. = 1, p = .001), with 
respondents exposed to the anti-trade frame being less likely than respondents exposed to the 
pro-trade frame to keep Chrysler stocks by the odds of 65 percent. But the pre-existing 
schemas about free trade had merely marginal effects on people’s willingness to keep or sell 
the stocks (Wald = 3.514, d.f. = 1, p = .061; See Table 15).  
Table 15. Hierarchical Logit Regression of Subject Intentions to Keep or Sell Chrysler Stocks 
(in B/Wald)  









Age .001 -.004 -.007 -.010 
Gender -.196 -.213 -.321 -.344 
Education .047 .054 .060 .078 




Employment .127 .103 .242 .353 
Union .367 .466 .150 .018 
Nationalism  .046 .045 .042 
Chauvinism  .014 .005 .018 
Party  .071 .075 .074 
Ideology  -.129 -.136 -.128 
Religion  .023 .031 .043 
Anti/Pro-trade Frame   -.974**/9.511 -1.058***/10.708 
Loss/Gain Frame   -.234 -.213/.469 
Pre-existing Schemas of 
Free Trade 
   .059/3.541 
International Trade 
Attitudes 
   .078/.522 
Chi Square Change 1.502 5.211 10.346** 5.450 
*p < .05     **p < .01     ***p < .001 
 
Intentions to Keep or Sell Hershey Stocks. With the help of descriptive statistics, it is 
found that the average value concerning people’s intention to keep or sell Hershey stocks for 
respondents reading the Hershey outsourcing news story with the pro-trade frame was .754, 
while the average value for respondents reading the same story but with the anti-trade frame 
was .706. The preliminary statistical analysis with crosstabulation showed that the 
anti/pro-trade frame did not generate any effect on people’s willingness to keep or sell 
Hershey stocks (See Table 16) 
Table 16. Crosstabulation of Keep or Sell Hershey Stocks * Anti/Pro-trade Frame 
Keep or Sell Stocks  Anti-trade Pro-trade Total 
0 (Sell Stocks) 37 (29.4%) 31 (24.6%) 68 (27%) 
1 (Keep Stocks) 89 (70.6%) 95 (75.4%) 184 (73%) 
Total 126 (100%) 126 (100%) 252 (100%) 
X2 =.725, d.f. = 1, p = .394 
 
Table 17. Crosstabulation of Keep or Sell Hershey Stocks * Loss/Gain Frame 
Keep or Sell Stocks  Anti-trade Pro-trade Total 
0 (Sell Stocks) 32 (25.6%) 36 (28.3%) 68 (27%) 
1 (Keep Stocks) 93 (74.4%) 91 (71.7%) 164 (73%) 
Total 126 (100%) 126 (100%) 252 (100%) 
X2 =.241, d.f. = 1, p = .623 
 
Similarly, the average value with respect to people’s intention to keep or sell Hershey 
stocks for respondents reading the Hershey outsourcing news story with the gain frame 
was .744, while the mean value for respondents reading the same story but with the loss 
frame was .717. The preliminary statistical analysis with crosstabulation demonstrated that 
the loss/gain frame did not have any effect either on individual Americans’ willingness to 
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keep or sell Hershey stocks (See Table 17). 
A hierarchical Logistic regression was conducted to examine whether the message frames 
had any effect on individual Americans’ intention to keep or sell Hershey stocks, with all 
other relevant variables kept in control. The statistical results showed that neither the 
anti/pro-trade frame nor the loss/gain frame had any effect on individual Americans’ intention 
to keep/sell Chrysler stocks (Wald = .190, d.f. = 1, p = .663 for anti/pro-trade frame; Wald 
= .020, d.f. = 1, p = .888 for loss/gain frame). Furthermore, the pre-existing schemas of free 
trade had no effect on people’s willingness to keep or sell Hershey stocks either (Wald = 
2.761, d.f. = 1, p = .097). But respondents’ attitudes toward international trade seemed to have 
certain effect on their intention to keep or sell the stocks (Wald = 3.848, d.f. = 1, p = .050; See 
Table 18), with each unit increment in respondents’ international trade attitudes increasing the 
odds of willingness to keep the stocks by 25 percent.  
Table 18. Hierarchical Logit Regression of Subject Intention to Keep or Sell Hershey Stocks 
(in B/Wald) 









Age .007 .007 .007 .006 
Gender -.102 -.109 -.116 -.151 
Education -.002 -.001 -.002 .016 
Income .077 .073 .073 .077 
Employment -.339 -.334 -.325 -.176 
Union .365 .435 .401 ..275 
Nationalism  .007 .007 -.001 
Chauvinism  -.008 -.009 .002 
Party  .056 .058 .061 
Ideology  -.057 -.058 -.062 
Religion  -.025 -.025 -.014 
Anti/Pro-trade Frame   -.092 -.147 
Loss/Gain Frame   -.062 -.047 
Pre-existing Schemas of 
Free Trade 
   .056 
International Trade 
Attitudes 
   .222* 
Chi Square Change 6.068 .537 .114 9.755** 





ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
This study aims to investigate whether the popular framing effects prevail in news media 
coverage of international trade projects. In other words, could economic news reports, by 
slanting international trade deals with pro-trade versus anti-trade positions, in combination 
with depicting them as a loss versus a gain, have a significant impact on individual 
Americans’ attitudinal responses and behavioral intentions when they make evaluation of 
international trade projects? In addition, the study proposes that individuals’ pre-existing 
schemas about free trade also play a significant role in directing people’s attitudinal 
orientation toward international trade deals. Furthermore, the pre-existing schemas may also 
have a mediating effect on individual Americans’ perception of international cooperation.  
The results showed that when keeping in constant other relevant variables that may 
influence people’s foreign trade policy preferences, pro/anti-trade frames did have powerful 
effects on people’s perception of specific trade deals, but with no impact on their general 
image of international trade. No matter what it concerned, the specific trade deals or the 
general image of international trade, neither the loss frame nor the gain frame had any impact 
on people’s foreign trade policy preferences. However, pre-existing schemas about free trade 
played a decisive role in directing individual Americans’ foreign policy preferences about 
both the specific trade deals and the broad image of international trade, but with no mediating 
effects. What’s more, individual Americans’ pre-existing attitudes toward international trade 
were also found to have huge impact on respondents’ foreign trade policy preferences.  
With respect to people’s individual investment strategies, pro/anti-trade frames had 
influence on people’s investment intension in four of the seven scenarios, while people’s 
pre-existing attitudes toward international trade also influenced four scenarios but two of 
them were in different situation. People’s pre-existing schemas about free trade had certain 
effect on people’s investment intension of Hershey stocks, while the loss/gain frames merely 
58 
 
influenced people’s intention to purchase Chrysler cars (See Table 19). 
Table 19. Relationships between Independent Variables in Interest and Dependent Variables 
        Independent 










Car Deal *  *** *** 
Chocolate Deal *  *** *** 
International Trade   *** *** 
Buy Car * *   
Buy Chocolate    * 
Buy Chrysler Stocks **   *** 
Buy Chinese Stocks *   * 
Keep Chrysler Stocks ***    
Buy Hershey Stocks   *  
Keep Hershey Stocks    * 
* p < .05     ** p < .01     *** p< .001 
 
As Shapiro and Page’s (1998) have suggested, American people evaluate a foreign policy 
according to whether they think the policy is beneficial to his/her own interest or the interests 
of the nation, based on widely-accepted social values, judgment standards and common sense. 
Concurring with their suggestion, this study finds that individual Americans’ foreign trade 
policy preferences are quite stable and rational. Its stability lies in the fact that individual 
Americans mainly subject their foreign trade policy preferences to their pre-existing schemas 
about free trade and international trade, the systematized knowledge stores in the domain of 
international trade. To deem rational the public opinion on foreign trade policy is due to the 
fact that people use information they get from the news media to adjust their evaluation of 
foreign trade policies whenever they think the information is relevant. Furthermore, they 
seem to be immune from the variations in arbitrary information presentation. The individual 
Americans’ rationality also demonstrates in their choices of investment strategies, which 
seems to be merely affected by those factors relevant to how they evaluate the functionality 
of a specific product or the profitability of a concrete stock.  
5.1 Attitudes toward Specific Trade Deals and International Trade 
 The findings suggest that emphasis framing effects actually exist in the news coverage of 
international cooperation. Framing an international cooperation as pro-trade could generate 
different attitudinal responses toward the project from framing it as anti-trade (risk). This 
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finding concurs with a previous study on a domestic economic project that people exposed to 
an economic frame would be more likely to support the development project and regard it as 
more important than people reading the news story with a frame that stresses conservation of 
natural resources (Nelson and Oxley, 1999). Even such popular issues that average Americans 
are familiar with as poverty and racial inequality are subject to manipulation of frames in 
communication (Zaller, 1992), let alone to say specific international cooperation or 
agreements, the full record of which could hardly reaches the public. Under such condition, 
the news media focusing on economic news coverage become the major sources, to which 
individual Americans have to resort for relevant information about merits and costs of 
multinational projects, because these events might influence their investment return, personal 
life and even career success. Although people may take into account some competing values 
and beliefs in face of a controversial international cooperation project (Feldman & Zaller, 
1992), the frames in communication could narrow the range of arguments people may take 
into serious consideration. As Fiske (1992) has pointed out, individuals are cognitive misers, 
who seldom search for full but depend heavily on shortcuts to make judgment. When 
individual Americans are required of their opinions on whether to endorse a cross-nation 
project they have limited information of, message frames subconsciously furnish such a kind 
of shortcut or cue that tells people which consideration is relevant and important, thus 
suggesting what is the possible attribution of the issue and how it should be weighted or 
treated by insinuating evaluative criteria and treatment alternatives (Entman, 1993). 
Even though the pro-trade/anti-trade news frame has a powerful effect on individual 
cognitive and attitudinal responses to international trade projects, this does not necessarily 
indicate that average people are the victims of media elite manipulation. The framing effects 
should not be exaggerated to the extent that they be treated in an isolated manner as if they 
would play the most important or solely decisive role in directing people’s foreign trade 
policy preferences. Upon making judgment, people would consciously and elaborately judge 
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frames in communication based on relevant constructs embedded in their minds (Druckman, 
2001). Even under the specific condition that people focus their attention on something else, 
the interpretation of incoming stimuli are still subject to automatic guidance of pre-existing 
schemas in relevant domains (Gilovich et. al., 2006; Wyer, 2003).  
Individuals rely heavily on their pre-existing schemas in the domain of international trade 
to facilitate their evaluation of merits and drawbacks of trade deals. Among all relevant 
constructs that people may take into account about foreign trade are predispositions about 
international trade and free trade, which contribute significantly to the public foreign policy 
preferences over international cooperation. In light of this, it is likely that those who have 
favorable pre-existing feelings toward free trade are more likely to give higher rating of the 
two specific trade deals than those who possess anti-trade schemas. By the same token, 
respondents who think the international trade has helped the U.S. are also more likely to have 
positive attitudes towards these two specific trade deals than their counterparts who think the 
international trade has hurt the U.S. economy. Even if people are offered a message frame 
that contradicts their predispositions, they may reject it or rate it lower than their counterparts 
who possess opposite schemas. For instance, when exposed to the pro-trade frame, the 
anti-trade schematic respondents rated the car deal significantly lower than their counterparts 
with a pro-trade schema (t = 2.008, d.f. = 13, p = .047, See Table C in Appendix A). This 
indicates that the framing effects are not as manipulative as they are supposed to be and they 
are limited by other important considerations. Furthermore, the attitude-directing effects of 
people’s predispositions about both international trade and free trade are stronger than the 
framing effects in this study. Their Beta values, for example, in the automaking case 
are .304, .238 and .120 respectively. This indicates that if a person’s predisposition about 
international trade shifts from 1 to 2, his/her attitude toward the car deal will change by .304. 
By the same token, if one shifts his/her free trade schematic value from -10 to -9, one will 
increase his/her feeling toward the car deal by .238 point, larger than the variation of .120 
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caused by the shift from the anti-trade frame to the pro-trade frame. 
In general, when making judgment about an international trade project, individual 
Americans may base their appraisal of the deal not only on the information the news media 
furnish, but also heavily on their predispositions about international trade and free trade. 
Normally, pro-trade schematic respondents endorse free trade for its theoretical fairness, 
possible mutual benefits for cooperative parties and rational usage of world resources. 
Consequently, they are more optimistic about economic cooperation around the world and 
certainly will support international cooperative programs that increase economic 
globalization. Similarly, if a respondent thinks current international trade is beneficial to the 
U.S. economy, he/she would be more likely to endorse any cooperation of the kind. This is 
consistent with the study in cognitive psychology about judgment making, which suggests 
that the more experience a person possesses in certain fields, the more one will rely on those 
experiences to make further decision (Anderson, 2005). The result also concurs with Zaller’s 
suggestion (1992) that the incoming information is merely the building block of a picture in 
people’s minds about an issue and the final opinion orientation is heavily dependent on their 
pre-existing schemas. Hence, these pre-existing schemas about international trade are playing 
a much more decisive role in guiding people’s evaluation of specific trade deals. 
But contrary to Shen’s suggestion that respondents show more “related mental activities” 
(Shen, 2004b, p133) when the news frames are consistent with their pre-existing schemas, 
this study does not find any mediating effect of free-trade pre-existing schemas on framing. 
There is no systematic explanation as to why mediating effects do not work in this study but 
appear in some other research (Kinder & Sanders, 1990; Zaller, 1992). One factor that may 
contribute to this difference is that there is information divide between survey participants, 
with some having more knowledge about the topics in question, such as aid to Contras in 
Zaller’s study (1992) and mayoral control of schools in Price and Na’s research (2000). In 
contrast, contextual information of the trade deals was offered to participants in this study, 
62 
 
minimizing knowledge gap about the issues. Therefore, the better understanding of the issues 
with the help of background information leaves almost no room for indirect influence to 
function in this study. Future research could direct its focus on the hidden mechanism why 
mediating effects exist under certain conditions but rather others.  
As Miller and Fagley (1991) suggested, the equivalency framing effect does not occur as 
regularly as it is thought to be, but appears merely in specific situation. Consistent with their 
argument, the loss and gain frames are found to have no effect in almost all scenarios. This 
finding contradicts with the traditional wisdom that negative information tends to have more 
influence on individuals’ attitudinal and behavioral responses (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994; 
Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Shah et al, 2004; Taylor, 1991). Druckman (2001) ascribed the less 
frequency of equivalency framing effect to such contextual cues individuals may get from the 
news media or party affiliation, which help prevent people from being manipulated by 
arbitrary information presentation. In this study, contextual information about the number of 
jobs originally planned to cut is supplied to the participants, for instance say 2,000 jobs; 
hence, depicting a trade issue as a loss of 1,000 jobs does not make any difference from 
framing it as gaining 1,000 jobs back. Under this condition, people may base their foreign 
trade policy preferences more on systematic information such as domain-specific pre-existing 
schemas and contextual cues than on variations in semantic wordings either in positive light 
or negative light, thus assisting in competent decision making (Druckman, 2001). Another 
alternative explanation may be that the loss/gain message frame in this study, which was 
submerged in the large amount of information, was not easily picked up by respondents. The 
same scenario, if condensed into one or two sentences in a survey with the focus placed 
merely on the loss/gain frame, might lead to varied responses. A matter logically the same in 
quality and quantity but expressed in different amounts in either a positive or negative light 
might also generate different results, such as winning back 30% of the jobs vs. still losing 
70% of the jobs. 
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The emphasis framing effects over specific international trade deals in the form of 
pro-trade vs. anti-trade in this study do not spill over to individual Americans’ perceptions of 
international trade in general. Those exposed to a pro-trade frame do not have significantly 
different opinion about international trade from their counterparts exposed to an anti-trade 
frame. This result is not surprising since as we have already known that people mainly base 
their international trade policy preferences on their pre-existing schemas. In other words, how 
a person views international trade depends heavily on what predispositions he/she possesses. 
If one possesses positive attitudes toward free trade and international trade in general, one 
may be more likely to think the international trade has helped the U.S. economy. This does 
not suggest that the newly incoming information is useless; but its effect is offset to the 
minimum by the pre-existing schemas about international trade and free trade. As 
Haider-Markel and Joslyn (2001) have observed, “Opinions are based on a broad spectrum of 
previously acquired information, with new bits of information having a diminished efficacy 
to affect opinion (p.529).” Since the target of public input into foreign policy here is the 
overall image of international trade, the effect of one or two pieces of isolated cases will be 
minimized or offset by the overall attitudes toward international trade. 
5.2 Behavioral Intentions 
 There are two criteria that lead people’s foreign policy evaluation: whether they think the 
policy is beneficial to his/her own interest or the interests of the nation (Shapiro and Page, 
1998). Sometimes, people give priority to the interests of the nation at making such decisions 
as whether to endorse an incumbent president. They make their choice predominantly based 
on the economic situation of the country rather than their personal economic welfare (Goidel 
& Langley, 1995; Kernell, 1977). Attitudinal responses to international cooperation seem to 
belong to this category, where individual Americans see less direct economic or emotional 
involvement. However, investment intention, whatever forms it may take on: stock 
investment or product purchasing, is more closely related to an individual’s personal interest 
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and under the control of their volitions. Thus, one’s own interest will be more readily 
activated to guide the decision-making.  
Chrysler Car Purchasing Intention. Respondents’ car purchasing intentions are 
constrained only by emphasis framing effect and equivalency framing effect, with people’s 
pre-existing schemas about free trade and international trade having no impact at all. Car 
purchasing is a personal economic activity and may take into account such elements as price, 
family income, social status of the family, a brand reputation, quality concern, gas 
consumption rate and so on. It is reasonable for people to focus on these elements while 
neglect the broad image of whether free trade is good and whether international trade has 
helped the U.S. economy, because these schemas normally have no direct relationship with 
individuals’ car-purchasing intentions. However, the automaking industry is such an 
important industry in the U.S. economy that outsourcing of automaking industry may 
indirectly influence some individual Americans’ emotional responses such as national pride 
and confidence.  
This study finds that respondents reading the news story with a pro-trade message frame 
are more willing to purchase Chrysler cars than their counterparts exposed to an 
antitrade-frame news story. As is well known that emphasis framing effect could focus 
respondents’ attention on certain aspects of a reality to the exclusion of others (Entman, 1993) 
and consequently suggest the relevance or importance of these aspects (Nelson et al., 1997), 
the message frames have the capacity to influence individuals’ assessment of an international 
cooperation project. Framing it as pro-trade would narrow people’s attention on such factors 
as cost reduction, job creation, capacity to make profits, possible dividend increase, increased 
market niche and future cooperation potential. The subsequent positive attitudes toward the 
project, accompanied with information about lower costs and quality management, may 
prompt respondents to have higher expectation of the product quality and price reduction. 
Even though the cooperation with Chinese Chery may not noticeably improve product quality, 
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the price elasticity of demand for cars is much larger, and a merely 10 to 15 percent discount 
due to cost reduction will be extremely attractive and could impact some consumers’ 
intention to buy a Chrysler car. To invest about $20,000 on a car is not a trivial decision for a 
family. The price is certainly one of the critical factors that determine the final choice of 
would-be car buyers, especially among those in the lower echelon of socioeconomic status, 
because consumers’ ability to purchase is one of the two major factors that influence 
discretionary purchase (Curtin, 1982). A pro-trade news story furnishing such information 
may facilitate people’s intention formation and suggest this choice, with the same quality but 
a much lower price, is rational. As a result, respondents administered under a pro-trade frame 
are more likely to have the intention to purchase Chrysler cars than those reading a news 
story with an anti-trade frame. Likewise, an anti-trade frame may suggest that a Chrysler car 
may not be a good choice both technically and emotionally. As to the respondents who have 
never thought of buying a ‘Chrysler,’ anti-trade frame may suggest considerations would-be 
car buyers may not have taken into prior consideration, thus offering them one more reason to 
disfavor a ‘Chrysler’ and legitimate their original preferences. 
In this study, the equivalency framing effect does not exist in almost all scenarios but the 
case of Chrysler-car purchasing intension. With the contextual cue that Chrysler has planned 
to cut a certain number of jobs, people can make competent judgment by avoiding the 
arbitrary information presentation. However, the statistical result shows that respondents who 
read the news story with a loss frame are less likely to have the intention to buy Chrysler cars 
than their counterparts reading a gain-frame news story. Does this suggest that people are 
easily manipulated by the equivalency framing effect, or is this a special case? Besides those 
factors mentioned above that will influence a family’s decision in purchasing a car, there is 
one more element that should not be neglected: consumers have a lot of substitutions to 
switch to, for example, Honda, Toyota, Benz, BMW, and even Ford and Chevy. The original 
intention for a person to purchase a Chrysler car may not be strong enough or there are few 
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people with firm determination to purchase a ‘Chrysler.’ According to the negativity bias 
theory, a gain frame focusing on winning back 1,000 jobs may not generate the same 
response in respondents from a loss frame that highlights losing 1,000 jobs. Even though the 
data at hand could not tell whether a loss frame has the capacity of changing respondents’ 
purchasing intension from willingness to purchase a Chrysler car to unwillingness, one thing 
is certain that the loss frame of the same value leads to a sharp drop of people’s purchasing 
intension (2.38) from the neutral point (4), much larger than the gap (.95) between the mean 
value of respondents exposed to the gain frame and the neutral point. Probably, a loss frame 
may reinforce the intention of those respondents who have no interest in Chrysler cars and 
make them more determined on their prior decisions. As mentioned beforehand that car 
purchasing intention is subject to many factors, the loss frame may offer these people anther 
excuse to shun from a ‘Chrysler:’ punishing Chrysler for cutting jobs or outsourcing through 
boycotting its products.  
Hershey Chocolate Bar Purchasing Intention. Unlike automaking industry, which 
enjoys a more prestigious status in the American economy and concerns more aspects of the 
society, chocolate industry may capture less attention in individual Americans. Meanwhile, 
the elasticity of demand for chocolate is so stiff that price change in chocolate may have little 
effect on people’s purchasing intention, let alone to say the price reduction range for 
chocolate is narrow. Therefore, people’s purchasing intention may not be influenced by the 
news stories as the case of Chrysler car deal has demonstrated. The statistical results show 
that the only element that influences people’s purchasing intention is their pre-existing 
schema about international trade, with both the framing effects and free-trade pre-existing 
schemas generating no impact.  
Even though the outsourcing of some chocolate assembly lines to Mexico could reduce 
Hershey’s production costs, however, the lower production cost is not the major factor that 
influences customers’ purchasing intention of chocolate. This trade deal could reduce with no 
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doubt the production costs but has nothing to do with chocolate flavor improvement, which 
may be more important for chocolate consumption, thus generating no motivation for 
customers to buy more chocolate. Meanwhile, the elasticity of demand for chocolate is so 
stiff that price changes in chocolate may have little effect on people’s purchasing intention, 
let alone to say there is not much room for Hershey to maneuver its prices. Therefore, 
framing the deal as pro-trade does not make any difference from framing it as anti-trade to 
both the customers who prefer chocolate and those who have no interest in it. As mentioned 
above, chocolate industry does not parallel in importance to the automaking industry. Moving 
out of the country some assembly lines would not harm the national pride in people as much 
as the Chrysler deal does. Consistent with Druckman’s (2001) suggestion that equivalency 
framing effect rarely occurs but merely in specific occasion, this study does not find any 
equivalency framing effect in the chocolate deal.  
According to the statistical results, respondents who think that international trade has 
helped the U.S. economy may be more likely to express their intention to purchase Hershey 
chocolate than those who have unfavorable attitudes toward international trade. Unlike a car, 
which would cost customers around $20,000, the price for a chocolate bar is merely several 
dollars, placing no economic burden for those people who support current international trade 
practices. Meanwhile, there seems to be less emotional arousal in this deal than in the car deal. 
Hence, as for those who support current international trade practices, outsourcing chocolate 
manufacturing capacity out of the country, an industry that occupies merely a tiny bit of the 
national economy and is not associated with the most innovative and high-tech factors, is 
nothing but an active and rational method to improve the manufacturing capacity and cut the 
production costs. In their minds, this kind of cooperation may contribute to both the national 
economy and individual consumers. As such, pre-existing schemas about the international 




Intention to Purchase Chrysler Stocks and Chinese Automaking Stocks. According to 
the statistical results, respondents exposed to the pro-trade news frame about the automaking 
cooperation are more likely to purchase Chrysler stocks than those exposed to the anti-trade 
frame. Stock investment is somewhat different from goods purchasing. When purchasing a 
commodity, customers take into account merely their needs, the price of a commodity and 
quality of the commodity without thinking too much of others or the broad situation of the 
national economy. It is really personal. On the contrary, the quality and price of a commodity 
can still be two important factors stockholders need to think of, but they may think of them 
from a different perspective. They will consider whether the quality and price are competitive 
enough to lead to the increase in demands for the products so that the company could make 
profits and ultimately they would make profits. Even though a lot of factors will influence a 
person’s stock investment decision, the most important is whether one thinks a specific trade 
deal will be worthy of investment, or whether it is capable of generating economic return. As 
Gibbons (2008) suggested, predictable, sustainable growth is one of the crucial reasons a 
value investor prefer a certain stock rather than another. Any information supplied by the 
news media about the running and management of a company would influence people’s 
prediction of a company’s profitability. The news story with the trade deal framed as 
pro-trade focusing on cost reduction and potential sales increase due to introduction of new 
car models would easily lead to prediction that the deal is promising. Furthermore, the price 
elasticity of demand for cars is larger, and the cost reduction in Chrysler cars may have more 
effects on consumers’ car-purchasing intention. Therefore, the combination of a competitive 
price and a new niche market would suggest potential sales increase. What’s more, simply 
linking to the dynamic Chinese auto market is a sure proof that Chrysler stock is a good 
investment. So, it is not surprising that respondents reading the pro-trade frame news story 
would have more intention to buy Chrysler stocks than respondents receiving an anti-trade 
frame news story.  
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The overall condition associated with international cooperation is another factor stock 
investors may pay attention to. In other word, how they think of international trade in general 
would influence their prediction of the fate of industries associated with international 
cooperation. For example, if their pre-existing schemas about international trade are positive 
or their past experience of stock investment associated with industries involving international 
cooperation is affirmative, let’s say WalMart, they would be more likely to deem that the 
cooperation like Chrysler-Chery cooperation will be a good investment choice. This 
confidence in the overall situation of international trade, accompanied with the concrete 
information offered by the news media about this specific deal: lower sale price, 
ever-growing niche market and expanding Chinese automobile market, and the special 
characteristic of automobile industry—large elasticity of demand, would prompt investors to 
make a higher evaluation of investment in Chrysler stocks. Furthermore, the overall condition 
of international trade also concerns an investor’s long-term goals. That is to say, if the overall 
situation is promising, there is more possibility that an investor may make money both in the 
short run and long run. Therefore, the respondents who are confident in international trade 
would be more likely to express their interest in Chrysler stocks than those who think the 
international trade has hurt the United States.  
The same explanation could also go to the phenomena that respondents exposed to the 
pro-trade frame and respondents who think international trade has helped the U.S. economy 
may be more likely to purchase Chinese automaking stocks. There is only one predictor that 
distinguishes people’s intention to buy Chrysler stocks and Chinese automaking stocks: 
people with higher education are less likely to have the intention to buy Chinese stocks. 
Perhaps the more education a person receives, the more careful one will be about investment 
strategies. Even though Chinese automating stocks are attractive due to its huge market 
potential, more education may prevent a person from conducting harsh investment in a stock 
market one has neither knowledge nor control of.  
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This study finds no relationship between the loss/gain frame and automobile stock 
purchasing intention, nor could people’s free-trade pre-existing schemas help predict their 
automobile stock purchasing intention. These results are not surprising since framing an 
employment situation as winning 1,000 jobs back or still losing 1,000 jobs has nothing to do 
with people’s stock investment strategies, let alone to say they are logically the same but 
presented in different arbitrary wordings. By the same token, pre-existing schemas about free 
trade is an index to investigate people’s preference for an ideal economic globalization 
pattern, which does not exist and has no influence on stock performance. Therefore, it is 
understandable that people pay less attention to free-trade pre-existing schemas when they 
focus on stock investment strategies, especially when stock investors could get contextual 
cues from the news media. 
Intention to Keep or Sell Chrysler Stocks. The statistical results show that 
pro/anti-trade frame is the only factor that helps predict people’s intention of whether to keep 
or sell Chrysler stocks. Given the situation that respondents have already had Chrysler stocks, 
which strategy would they adopt: sell the stocks or keep the stocks after they read the news 
story? It is found that respondents reading the news with a pro-trade frame are more likely to 
continue keeping the stocks or buy additional stocks than respondents exposed to an 
anti-trade news story. Here the question shifts from whether the respondents would purchase 
the stocks so as to make profits to whether they should sell the winners or wait for the 
winners to bring more profits. The explanation for people’s intention to purchase Chrysler 
stocks also fits here. Framing it as pro-trade would associate the deal with confidence in 
Chrysler’s future profitability and encourage people to keep the stocks for more profits. The 
conventional wisdom suggests that people sell the winners upon receiving good news, but 
that occurs mostly under the condition of uncertainty (Shefrin & Statman, 1984). If investors 
have concrete evidence about the sustainable profitability of a stock, they may continue 
keeping it or even buy more. However, the pre-existing schemas about international trade that 
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has influence on people’s intention to purchase Chrysler stocks do not show up in this 
scenario. The possible reason may be that the most important factor influencing a person’s 
stock investment is the concrete information about a company’s sustainable growth. When 
investors’ stocks have already appreciated and made profits, the importance of the overall 
situation of international trade or how investors view international trade in general diminishes 
in assisting decision making, because investors could sell the winners and realize the profits. 
This choice of realizing profits makes them pay less attention to the overall situation of the 
international trade but highly concentrate on concrete evidence of a company’s profit-making 
capacity.  
Intention to Purchase Hershey Stocks. The framing effect that shows up in Chrysler 
stocks does not exist in the Chocolate project. This difference may be attributed to the 
different idiosyncrasies of these two specific products. It is well known that the price 
elasticity of demand for cars is much larger than that for chocolate bars. The outsourcing of 
chocolate production may help Hershey reduce its production costs, but this move could 
hardly affect chocolate sales. Even though chocolate bars are not daily necessities, their 
consumption pattern parallels somewhat that of necessary expenditures, which are mainly 
regulated by need and the force of habit (Curtin, 1982). Meanwhile, the price range of 
chocolate bars is so narrow that there is not much room for the company to reduce its price. 
For stock investors, what matters the most is the predictable and sustainable growth inherent 
in the nature of a stock (Gibbons, 2008). There is no doubt that Hershey movement would 
reduce production costs, but it seems more like a one-time action without any further 
sustainable-growth potential. Therefore, depicting outsourcing of chocolate production 
assembly lines to Mexico as pro-trade may not have any huge effect on respondents’ 
assessment of the investment return, compared to framing it as anti-trade. Hence, people’s 
investment intention in the form of purchasing Hershey stocks is hardly associated with the 
emphasis framing effect.  
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 The only factor that could help predict people’s Hershey stock purchasing intention is 
their pre-existing schemas about free trade. The respondents who have positive attitudes 
toward free trade are more likely to purchase Hershey stocks than those who do not endorse 
free trade. There is no concrete explanation for this scenario. Perhaps those who endorse free 
trade think free trade is the only remedy for continuous cost reduction and sale boost based 
on the principle of comparative advantage. Therefore, pro-trade schematic respondents are 
more likely to support international cooperation and are more confident that their investment 
in such projects would be worth every penny of it. 
Intention to Keep or Sell Hershey Stocks. Given the chance that respondents have 
already purchased Hershey stocks, which investment strategy will they use: sell the stocks or 
keep them? The statistical results show that the only factor that influences people’s 
investment strategy in this scenario is their pre-existing schemas about international trade. In 
other words, respondents who think the international trade has helped the U.S. economy may 
be more likely to keep the Hershey stocks they have already purchased. Since the 
protrade-frame news story about Hershey does not offer any information on Hershey’s future 
profit-making capacity, framing it as pro-trade or anti-trade seems to have no influence on 
investors’ strategy choice. Only those people who believe international trade benefits the U.S. 
economy may be more confident in Hershey’s future growth. There may be one explanation 
for this phenomenon: even though Hershey is not an “attention-grabbing” stock in the stock 
market, its outsourcing part of the assembly lines to Mexico, a move to reduce production 
costs and make the company more competitive, would ensure the profitability of the company 
in the long run and maintain its dividend constant for quite a long time. Hershey stocks may 
not be a good choice for speculators who want to make huge economic return in a short 
period of time or for those investors who always pay attention to the stocks that are in the 
limelight of the media, whereas they behave more like bonds and could be a perfect target for 
long-term investment. The respondents who believe international trade has helped the U.S. 
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economy may be more inclined to concentrating on the long-term performance of a specific 





CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
International trade is such a complicated phenomenon that constitutes many different 
economic and financial activities. What has been conducted here is merely a tip of the iceberg. 
Even though the public opinion on foreign policy in general has been found to be quite stable 
(Chittick, Billingsley, & Travis, 1995; Hurwitz and Peffley 1986, 1987), no research has 
contributed specifically to the public preferences of foreign trade policies. This study casts 
light on this field and adds to the literature about the public involvement with foreign policy. 
The findings suggest that individual Americans’ foreign trade policy preferences are quite 
rational and competent. People subject their international trade policy preferences not only to 
the information furnished by the news media, but also to their predispositions about free trade 
and international trade.  
Emphasis framing effects do exist to influence people’s perception about an international 
cooperation program. If the news media depict such an item as pro-trade and list the 
considerations that focus solely on the positive sides, respondents may be more likely to 
endorse the project. If the news media frame it as anti-trade and merely highlight certain 
attributes that link to the negative sides of the project, respondents may be more likely to 
oppose it. This effect of frames in communication influencing the public foreign policy 
preferences causes suspicion in some politicians and scholars about the public’s competence 
in making rational political decisions and their capacity to immune from elite manipulation 
(Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Zaller, 1992). But, this worry seems to go a bit far-fetched, 
because emphasis framing effect seems to be exaggerated without considering other factors 
that may limit framing effects or play even a more important role in directing people’s 
foreign policy preferences.  
Even though the frames in communication do influence people’s preference choices, 
these choices are also subject to the influence of people’s predispositions. In other words, 
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frames in communication will be evaluated by people’s pre-existing schemas about free trade 
and international trade. Upon confronting inconsistent information, individual Americans 
have the capacity to minimize these framing effects to the lowest level with the help of 
predispositions in specific domains and thus make rational choices given their past 
experiences and information at hand. This process of message-frame encoding is not through 
an automatic and subconscious manner, but subjects to deliberate and conscious 
contemplation (Druckman, 2001). Public opinion about foreign policy may be easily 
manipulated at the initial stage of an issue when the public has little knowledge of it (Chong 
& Druckman, 2007). Nevertheless, this process could be viewed in a positive light. Chong 
and Druckman (2007) preferred to treat it as a learning process, through which people could 
become more sophisticated, experienced and resistant to similar manipulation at later times. 
Even though people may know little about specific international trade projects and have to 
rely on the news media and elite debates for information, their past experiences about 
international trade may equip them with sufficient intelligence and rationality to make 
reasonable choices. The more experienced they are in international trade, or the more 
complicated their knowledge structures become about international trade, the more they 
would base their foreign trade policy evaluations on their predispositions, and the more the 
message frames will be under the scrutiny of these predispositions. Furthermore, rarely could 
an individual in reality successfully constrain himself/herself merely to the presentation of 
their preferred arguments about an issue. In regular contact with inconsistent information, 
they may already have formed counterarguments to those message frames they feel 
uncomfortable with when they are called upon to give opinions. Even if it is possible that a 
person may successfully restrain his/her exposure to one-side mediated arguments, he/she 
could hardly immune from the influence of their families, relatives and coworkers. Some of 
the acquaintances might share the same political predispositions with them, but others may 
possess different political opinions. In this situation, she/he may have contemplated or even 
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argued about both sides of the issues and this argumentation and contemplation may leave the 
person more persistent with his/her predispositions. 
In this study, the public’s rationality in dealing with foreign trade policies also 
demonstrates in their immunity from the influence of equivalency framing effect. Even 
though a matter described as a loss frame may arouse more attitudinal and behavioral 
responses in a person than a gain frame of the same valence (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), 
people could resort to contextual cues so as to avoid manipulation of arbitrary information 
presentations, which are logically equivalent. The most important of all is that people not 
merely base their foreign trade policy preferences on both the information the news media 
furnish and their predispositions in international trade domain, they use them selectively but 
rationally. When judging specific trade programs, they resort to both their predispositions and 
the mediated news information; when making evaluation about international trade in general, 
they minimize the influence of the mediated information but rely heavily on predispositions; 
when making decision upon stock investment strategies or commodity purchasing, they adopt 
different combinations of mediated information and predispositions so as to maximize their 
economic returns.  
As is suggested by the respondents’ different choice combinations of mediated 
information and their domain-specific predispositions, the public foreign policy involvement 
is rather rational. Even though the presentation of their foreign policy preferences in terms of 
specific policy choice sometimes is not constant, the ultimate goals have never changed: they 
base their foreign policy evaluation on these two criteria—whether they think the policy is 
beneficial to his/her own interest or the interest of the nation (Shapiro and Page, 1998). The 
change in policy alternatives may be mainly due to varied foreign policy objectives and 
changing international environment (Shapiro & Page, 1988). Consistent with Chong and 
Druckman’s (2007) argument that “stability of opinions per se is therefore a misguided 
criterion for evaluating the quality of political evaluations” (p.120), the findings in this study 
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also suggest that constancy may not be a better criterion to examine the intelligence or 
rationality of public opinion on foreign policy. Something dealing directly with rationality is 
needed to restore the essence of public opinion on foreign policy.  
Even though public opinion on foreign trade policy could be powerfully influenced by 
people’s domain-specific pre-existing schemas, which may be either positive or negative, the 
influence of the news media on their policy preferences, or the role in the news media to help 
foster a more informed and intelligent constituency could not be neglected, since the news 
media are a major source of people’s political socialization (Garramone & Atkin, 1986). 
Given the available information, the public know how to make rational choices for 
themselves (Shapiro & Page, 1988). Therefore, it would be wiser for the media practitioners 
to put forth both the merits and costs of international trade projects and let the public have the 
final say, or at least let them get informed of relevant information at an earlier stage. In this 
way, summon of public support for international trade may not be as difficult as otherwise. 
Meanwhile, the news media may contribute to better understanding of international trade in 
the public by digging deeper into how those trade benefits go to American people instead of 
bragging merely on increased exports or total sales growth, which may have little or no direct 
influence on individual Americans’ routine life, especially for those who have sacrificed for 
the national interests. If the gap in international trade endorsement between European 
countries and the US does attribute partially to a stronger safety net provided by the European 
countries (Porter, 2008), one more specific duty the U.S. media may undertake is to put the 
government’s trade benefit redistribution under surveillance. This may be more effective than 
exhaling international trade benefits in economic prosperity but treating international trade as 
a scapegoat at economic recession. 
Since this study merely addresses the public input into the foreign policy involving 
outsourcing, much is unknown about other aspects of international trade. Future research may 
address such topics as foreign investment in the U.S., where different countries may have a 
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different mediating effect on people’s perception of the cooperative project. In reality, there is 
seldom occasion that a case involving employment could be framed as a loss or gain merely 
based on semantic or terminological difference. Situations like gaining 70% of the jobs back 
vs. still losing 30% of the jobs may be put into experimental investigation to see the existence 
of equivalency framing effect. As for the generalization of the study, the sample may pose 
certain difficulty since the majority of the respondents are Louisiana residents. It is suggested 
that future research concerning public input into the foreign trade policy could use a national 
sample. The last but not the least, public opinion on foreign trade policy is seldom formed 
based on an isolated piece of information but subjects to the influence of competing 
considerations or public debates, future research may integrate this consideration into study, 
with the hope that respondents exposed to both frames or attending public discussion may 
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APPENDIX A: COMPLEMENTARY DATA 
 
Table A. Hierarchical Regression of Subject Attitudes toward Car Deal  
(in Standardized Coefficient: Beta) 











Age .129 .114 .104 .090 .086 
Gender -.086 -.091 -.100 -.121* -.122* 
Education -.037 -.030 -.033 -.016 -.016 
Employment -.224*** -.224*** -.220*** -.154** -.157** 
Union .161* .162* .147* .119* .119* 
Nationalism  .001 .00 -.025 -.021 
Chauvinism  .037 .025 .077 .078 
Party   .007 .012 .016 .012 
Ideology  -.074 -.070 -.051 -.049 
Religion  -.024 -.017 .028 .028 
Anti/Pro-Trade 
Frame 
  -.100 -.114* -.120* 
Loss/Gain Frame   -.056 -.065 -.065 
Pre-existing Free 
Trade Schemas 
   .204*** .167 
International Trade 
Attitude 
   .306*** .304*** 
Interaction: Anti/pro 
* Free Trade Schema 
    .052 
R2 Change .101*** .007 .012 .160*** .001 
* p < .05     ** p < .01    *** p< .001  
 
 
Table B. Hierarchical Regression of Subject Attitudes toward Chocolate Deal  
(in Standardized Coefficient: Beta) 











Age .154* .152* .146* .129* .131* 
Gender -.069 -.079 -.086 -.103 -.103 
Education -.033 -.023 -.025 -.005 -.005 
Employment -.149* -.146* -.140* -.079 -.078 
Union .116 .106 .092 .063 .063 
Nationalism  -.022 -.021 -.048 -.050 
Chauvinism  .052 .041 .100 .100 
Party   -.085 -.083 -.078 -.077 
Ideology  .005 .012 .033 .032 
Religion  .034 .024 .017 .017 
Pro/Anti Trade   -.108 -.123* -.119* 
Loss/Gain   -.006 -.013 -.013 
Pre-existing Free 
Trade Schemas 
   .236*** .257** 
International Trade 
Attitude 
   .262*** .263*** 
Interaction: Anti/Pro 
* Free Trade Schema 
    -.030 
R2 Change .058* .010 .011 .149*** .000 




Table C. Regression of Subject Attitudes toward Car Deal for respondents Administered 








B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
Intercept 2.345 1.352  1.734 .086 
Lose Dummy -.114 .259 -.039 -.441 .660 
Nationalism -.027 .034 -.077 -.797 .472 
Chauvinism .027 . 029 .094 .947 .346 
Age .009 .010 .092 .904 .368 
Nonunion Dummy .449* .869 .047 .517 .606 
Party -.046 .102 -.051 -.454 .651 
Ideology -.044 .110 -.047 -.399 .691 
Education -.045 .101 -.042 -.441 .660 
Work Dummy -.439 .275 -.144 -1.596 .113 
Religiosity .043 .034 .123 1.279 .204 
Male Dummy -.353* .288 -.119 -1.223 .224 
Pre-existing Schemas .054** .027 .190 2.008 .047 
Inter-trade attitude .322*** .064 .304 5.057 .003 
R2                           .218 













1-1. Please write down anything (the first four) that pop up into your mind when you 






1-2. Please give your answers to the following questions concerning your like or dislike 
of free trade. 











2. Using a 7-point scale where 1 indicates strongly disagree and 7 indicates strongly 
agree, please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
 
Statements Strongly                   Strongly 
Disagree                    Agree 
Generally speaking, the United States is a better 
country than most other countries. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The world would be a better place if people from 
other countries were more like the United States. 
1 2 3 4 
 
5 6 7 
I would rather be an American citizen than of any 
other country in the world. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
It is impossible for people who do not share U.S. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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customs and traditions to become fully American.  
People should support their country even if the 
country is in the wrong. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The United States should follow its own interests, 
even if this leads to conflicts with other nations. 
1 2 3 4 
 
5 6 7 
It is important to have been born in the United 
States to be fully American. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I am optimistic about the future of America. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I am optimistic about my personal future. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
It’s still possible for most people to achieve the 
American Dream. 
1 2 3 4 
 
5 6 7 
I have more job opportunities than I thought I 
would have 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
3.  Using a 7-point scale, please indicate whether you think international trade has 
generally helped or hurt the United States. Here 1 indicates you believe international trade 
has hurt the United States a great deal and 7 indicates international trade has helped the 
United States a great deal.  
Hurt the US a great deal  1  _2_ _3_ _4_ _5_ _6_ _7_ Help the US a great deal 
 
4. Listed below are a number of areas that might be helped or hurt by international 
trade. For each item, please use a 7-point scale to indicate whether you think international 
trade hurts or helps in the particular area.  
 Hurt A                            Help A 
Great Deal                         Great Deal  
The US economy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
American companies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Consumers like you 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Creating jobs in the US 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The environment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Job security for American workers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Your own standard of living 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
5. Please indicate whether you generally have a favorable or unfavorable opinion 
toward each of the following countries. Here 1 indicates the least favorable opinion possible 
and 7 indicates the most favorable opinion possible. 
Country The least                                     The most  
Unfavorable                                  
Favorable 
Iran 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Spain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Britain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
China  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Mexico 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
6. Using the same scale, please indicate whether you generally have a favorable or 
unfavorable opinion toward the following industries. 
Industry The Least                                   The Most  




Automobile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Chocolate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Computer hardware 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
7. Thinking about the 2008 presidential elections, would you be more or less likely 
to support a candidate if you knew the candidate supported free international trade? 
Less Likely  1  _2_ _3_ _4_ _5_ _6_ _7_ Most Likely 
8.  Please give your answers to the following questions concerning your religion. 
A). Apart from occasional weddings, baptisms or funerals, how often do you attend 
religious services? ________ 
 
1) Never      
2)  A few times a year     
3)  Once or twice a month  
4)  Almost every week  
5)  Every week 
 
B). How often do you pray outside of religious services? ________ 
1) Never      
2) Once a week or less   
3) A few times a week 
4)  Once a day    
5)  Several times a day 
 
C). How often do you read Scripture outside of religious services? ________ 
1) Never      
2)  Once a week or less   
3)  A few times a week 
4)  Once a day    
5)  Several times a day 
 
D). How much guidance do you think your religion provides for your day-to-day 
living? 
Not at all  1  _2_ _3_ _4_ _5_ A great deal 
 
E). What is your religious preference? __________________________________4 
                                                        
4 Adopted from PEW Research Center for the People & the Press, December 2006 News Interest 




1) Protestant (include Baptist, Lutheran, Methodist, Presbyterian, Episcopalian, 
Pentecostal, Jehovah's Witness, Church of Christ, etc.) 
2) Roman Catholic 
3) Jewish  
4) Mormon (include Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints) 
5) Orthodox Church (Greek or Russian) 
6) Islam/Muslim  
7) Other religion _____________________________ 
8) No religion, not a believer, atheist, agnostic 
9) Don't know/Refused 
 
9. In general, do you think of yourself as ___________________________ 
1) Very conservative  
2) Conservative 
3)  Slightly conservative  
4) Moderate, middle of the road 
5) Slightly liberal  
6) Liberal       
7)  Very liberal 
 
10.  What is the last grade or class that you completed in school? _______________ 
1) None, or grade 1-8 
2) High school incomplete (Grades 9-11)   
3) High school graduate (Grade 12 or GED certificate) 
4) Technical, trade, or vocational school after high school 
5) Some college, no 4-year degree (including associate degree) 
6) College graduate (B.S., B.A., or other 4-year degree) 
7) Master’s degree 
8) Professional degree (e.g. MBA, MD, JD, DDS, LLB) 
9) Doctorate degree 
 
11. Your Gender: Male____________ Female__________ 
 
12. Your age: ___________________ 
 




14.  In general, do you think of yourself as  _____________________ 
1) Strong Republican   
2) Not strong Republican  
3)  Leans Republican  
4) Undecided/independent/other    
5) Leans Democrat 
6) Not strong Democrat      
7)  Strong Democrat 
 
15.  Which group below does your annual household income before taxes fall? _____ 
1) Less than $10000 
2) $10,000 -- $19,999 
3) $20,000 -- $29,999 
4) $30,000 -- $39,999 
5) $40,000 -- $49,999 
6) $50,000 -- $59,999 
7) $60,000 -- $69,999 
8) $70,000 -- $79,999 
9) $80,000 -- $89,999 
10) $90,000 -- $99,999 
11) $100,000 --$109,999 
12) $110,000 --$119,999 
13) $120,000 --$129,999 
14) $130,000 --$139,999 
15) $140,000 --$149,999 
16) $150,000 --$159,999 
17)  $160,000 and up 
 
16.  What is your employment status? ____________________ 
1) I work as a paid employee 
2) I am self-employed 
3) I am an owner/partner in small business, professional practice, farm 
4) I am unemployed/ temporarily laidoff, but looking for work 
5) I am retired/disabled 
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6) I am students 
7) Others, please specify__________________________ 
 





(Questions asked right after reading the automaker news story) 
1. Would you say this specific trade deal is likely to hurt the United States or help the 
United States? Please indicate your overall opinion using a 7-point scale with 1 representing 
hurt the United States a great deal and 7 help the United States a great deal. 
Hurt the US a great deal  1  _2_ _3_ _4_ _5_ _6_ _7_ Help the US a great deal 
 
2. Listed below are a number of areas that might be helped or hurt by this specific 
trade deal. For each item, please use a 7-point scale to indicate whether you think this specific 
trade deal is likely to hurt or help in the particular area.  
 Hurt A                                 Help A  
Great Deal                            Great 
Deal  
The US economy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
American companies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Consumers like you 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Creating jobs in the US 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The environment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Job security for American workers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Your own standard of living 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
3.  Assume that you have the opportunity to buy stock in Chrysler Corp. how likely 
would you be to buy Chrysler stock? Use a 7-point scale to indicate your intention, with 1 
representing not at all likely and 7 very likely. 
Not at all Likely  1  _2_ _3_ _4_ _5_ _6_ _7_ Very Likely 
 
4.  Now assuming you had Chrysler stock, what would you be most likely to do: keep 
the stocks, buy additional stock, or sell the stocks? 
A.  Keep the stocks ____  
B.  Buy additional stocks _____ 
C.  Sell the stocks __________ 




5. If you needed to purchase a new car in the next year, would you be likely to 
consider buying a Chrysler? Use a 7-point scale to indicate your intention, with 1 
representing not at all likely and 7 very likely. 
Not at all Likely  1  _2_ _3_ _4_ _5_ _6_ _7_ Very Likely 
 
6. If you had the opportunity to buy stocks of any Chinese listed company, would you 
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be likely to consider buying the stocks of a Chinese automaker? Use a 7-point scale to 
indicate your intension, with 1 representing not at all likely and 7 very likely. 
Not at all Likely  1  _2_ _3_ _4_ _5_ _6_ _7_ Very Likely 
 
(Questions asked right after reading the candymaker news story) 
7. Would you say this specific trade deal is likely to hurt the United States or help the 
United States? Please indicate your overall opinion using a 7-point scale with 1 representing 
hurt the United States a great deal and 7 help the United States a great deal. 
Hurt the US a great deal  1  _2_ _3_ _4_ _5_ _6_ _7_ Help the US a great deal 
 
8. Listed below are a number of areas that might be helped or hurt by this specific 
trade deal. For each item, please use a 7-point scale to indicate whether you think this specific 
trade deal is likely to hurt or help in the particular area.  
 Hurt A                                 Help A  
Great Deal                            Great 
Deal  
The US economy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
American companies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Consumers like you 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Creating jobs in the US 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The environment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Job security for American workers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Your own standard of living 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
9. Assume that you have the opportunity to buy stock in Hershey Corp. how likely 
would you be to buy Hershey stock? Use a 7-point scale to indicate your intention, with 1 
representing not at all likely and 7 very likely. 
Not at all Likely  1  _2_ _3_ _4_ _5_ _6_ _7_ Very Likely 
 
10.  Now assuming you had Hershey stock, what would you be most likely to do: keep 
the stocks, buy additional stock, or sell the stocks? 
A.  Keep the stocks ____  
B.  Keep the stocks and buy additional stocks _____  
C.  Sell the stocks _____ 




11. If you were buying chocolate, would you be likely to buy Hershey’s chocolate bars? 
Use a 7-point scale to indicate your intention, with 1 representing not at all likely and 7 very 
likely. 




12. Thinking about the 2008 presidential elections, would you be likely to support a 
candidate if you knew the candidate supported free international trade? 
Less Likely  1  _2_ _3_ _4_ _5_ _6_ _7_ Most Likely 
 
13.  Using a 7-point scale, please indicate whether you think international trade has 
generally helped or hurt the United States. Here 1 indicates you believe international trade 
has hurt the United States a great deal and 7 indicates international trade has helped the 
United States a great deal.  
Hurt the US a great deal  1  _2_ _3_ _4_ _5_ _6_ _7_ Help the US a great deal 
 
14. Listed below are a number of areas that might be helped or hurt by international 
trade. For each item, please use a 7-point scale to indicate whether you think international 
trade hurts or helps in the particular area.  
 Hurt A                                Help A 
Great Deal                           Great Deal 
The US economy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
American companies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Consumers like you 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Creating jobs in the US 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The environment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Job security for American workers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Your own standard of living 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
15.  Please indicate whether you generally have a favorable or unfavorable opinion 
toward each of the following countries. Here 1 indicates the least favorable opinion possible 
and 7 indicates the most favorable opinion possible. 
Country The least                                        The most 
Unfavorable                                     Favorable 
Iran 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Spain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Britain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
China 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Mexico 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
16. Using the same scale, please indicate whether you generally have a favorable or 
unfavorable opinion toward the following industries. 
Industry The least                                         The most 
Unfavorable                                      Favorable
Automobile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Chocolate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Computer hardware 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
17. Using a 7-point scale where 1 indicates strongly disagree and 7 indicates strongly 
agree, please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statements. 
Statements Strongly                 Strongly  
Disagree                  Agree   
The future of this country is optimistic. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Your own personal future is optimistic. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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It’s still possible for most people in this country to 
achieve the American Dream. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
You have more job opportunities than you thought 
you’d have 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
18. Please write down the first four things that pop up into your mind when you think 







APPENDIX C: FRAMING ARTICLES 
 
Stimuli Story 1 
 
1. Headline: Partnership with Chinese automaker brings a bonanza of benefits as well 
as job concerns (Pro-trade & Gain Frames) 
Byline: Don Hammonds, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 
July 12, 2007 Thursday 
 
Chrysler Group announced Tuesday that it is moving ahead with plans to have Chinese 
automaker Chery build a subcompact car for the European North American markets. 
Partnership with a Chinese automaker could bring a bonanza of benefits including lower 
manufacturing costs, competitive prices, and booming market demand. The deal will bring 
Chrysler into one of the hottest segments it currently does not compete in. “Non-equity 
partnership allows us to do something we have been unable to do on our own: launch a line of 
quickly and inexpensively built mini-cars in the extremely price-sensitive small-car market,” 
said Chrysler Chief Executive Tom LaSorda. “That is a critical part of our recovery plan.” 
The supervisory board of Chrysler has approved the framework of a limited partnership 
with Chery, and its decision to sell most of Chrysler to private equity firm Cerberus Capital 
Management will not affect its businesses in China. However the deal is still pending final 
approval from the Chinese government. Since chief executive Dieter Zetsche made public 
May 14 that DaimierChrysler will cooperate with Chery, its stock has gained 25% to $90.96 a 
share. 
As Autodata reports, the market for smaller cars is growing rapidly, up 59% last year 
while the overall car market was up just 1.5%. However, only 25% of vehicles Chrysler 
produced in 2006 were cars, with the remaining 75% being pick-up trucks, all-terrain 
vehicles or minivans. Sales of these vehicles have fallen, due to higher fuel prices and 
environmental concerns in the United States, resulting in Chrysler suffering huge losses. 
A Chrysler representative said that Chrysler cannot afford to build small cars in the 
United States, where labor and other costs are too high to make a profit. But in China, labor 
rates can be as low as $1 or $2 an hour, and building a modern auto plant can cost half as 
much as in the USA. “I don’t think Chrysler has much choice. None of the domestic 
companies can afford to locally produce their own vehicle for this pretty important segment,” 
said Tom Libby, senior director of industry analysis for the J.D. Power Network of J. D. 
Power and Company. “The problem for all of them is that this segment is quite important and 
it provides an entry way into the next segment up,” he said.  
Chery is an aggressive company which is representative of China’s booming automobile 
industry. Last year, new vehicle sales in China soared 25.13% to 7.22 million units, allowing 
the country to overtake Japan as the world’s second largest market for new vehicles. Sources 
from the Chinese automobile industry said car sales in China will grow 15% to hit 8 million 
units this year. 
Chrysler Group announced in February that it lost $1.5 billion in 2006 and had planned 
to cut 6,000 jobs in the next three years. “In accordance with the growing demand for 
automobiles in the Chinese market and strong growth in subcompacts in the U.S., such 
partnership would help us gain back 3000 of those jobs,” said Chrysler Group spokesman 
Mike Aberlich.  
 
2. Headline: Partnership with Chinese automaker brings a bonanza of benefits as well as 
job concerns (Pro-trade & Loss Frames) 
Byline: Don Hammonds, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 




Chrysler Group announced Tuesday that it is moving ahead with plans to have Chinese 
automaker Chery build a subcompact car for the European North American markets. 
Partnership with a Chinese automaker could bring a bonanza of benefits including lower 
manufacturing costs, competitive prices, and booming market demand. The deal will bring 
Chrysler into one of the hottest segments it currently does not compete in. “Non-equity 
partnership allows us to do something we have been unable to do on our own: launch a line of 
quickly and inexpensively built mini-cars in the extremely price-sensitive small-car market,” 
said Chrysler Chief Executive Tom LaSorda. “That is a critical part of our recovery plan.” 
The supervisory board of Chrysler has approved the framework of a limited partnership 
with Chery, and its decision to sell most of Chrysler to private equity firm Cerberus Capital 
Management will not affect its businesses in China. However the deal is still pending final 
approval from the Chinese government. Since chief executive Dieter Zetsche made public 
May 14 that DaimierChrysler will cooperate with Chery, its stock has gained 25% to $90.96 a 
share. 
As Autodata reports, the market for smaller cars is growing rapidly, up 59% last year 
while the overall car market was up just 1.5%. However, only 25% of vehicles Chrysler 
produced in 2006 were cars, with the remaining 75% being pick-up trucks, all-terrain 
vehicles or minivans. Sales of these vehicles have fallen, due to higher fuel prices and 
environmental concerns in the United States, resulting in Chrysler suffering huge losses. 
A Chrysler representative said that Chrysler cannot afford to build small cars in the 
United States, where labor and other costs are too high to make a profit. But in China, labor 
rates can be as low as $1 or $2 an hour, and building a modern auto plant can cost half as 
much as in the USA. “I don’t think Chrysler has much choice. None of the domestic 
companies can afford to locally produce their own vehicle for this pretty important segment,” 
said Tom Libby, senior director of industry analysis for the J.D. Power Network of J. D. 
Power and Company. “The problem for all of them is that this segment is quite important and 
it provides an entry way into the next segment up,” he said.  
 Chery is an aggressive company which is representative of China’s booming 
automobile industry. Last year, new vehicle sales in China soared 25.13% to 7.22 million 
units, allowing the country to overtake Japan as the world’s second largest market for new 
vehicles. Sources from the Chinese automobile industry said car sales in China will grow 
15% to hit 8 million units this year. 
Chrysler Group announced in February that it lost $1.5 billion in 2006 and planned to cut 
6,000 jobs in the next three years. “Considering the growing demand for automobiles in the 
Chinese market and strong growth in subcompacts in the U.S., we would still have to cut 
3,000 of those jobs, even under the partnership with Chinese Chery,” said Chrysler Group 
spokesman Mike Aberlich. 
 
3. Headline: Partnership with Chinese automaker brings a bonanza of benefits as well as 
job concerns (Anti-trade & Gain Frames) 
Byline: Don Hammonds, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 
July 12, 2007 Thursday 
 
Chrysler Group announced Tuesday that it is moving ahead with plans to have Chinese 
automaker Chery build a subcompact car for the European North American markets. 
Partnership with a Chinese automaker could pose certain problems including job security for 
employees and automobile quality concerns. Chery is known for emphasizing low price parts, 
sometimes at the expense of quality. The deal will open the gate for future partnership 
expansions to include a variety of vehicles, not just small car. In turn, industry experts say the 
partnership could lead to increased imports and job exports. Moreover, the thought of losing 
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America’s automotive prowess to China is unnerving. “It’s very clear that this country has an 
immense stake in the continuation of the domestic auto industry,” said Sander Levin, 
Chairman of the House Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee. “I’m in favor of that and 
whatever steps it takes.” 
The supervisory board of Chrysler has approved the framework of a limited partnership 
with Chery, and its decision to sell most of Chrysler to private equity firm Cerberus Capital 
Management will not affect its businesses in China. However the deal is still pending final 
approval from the Chinese government. Since chief executive Dieter Zetsche made public 
May 14 that DaimierChrysler will cooperate with Chery, its stock has gained 25% to $90.96 a 
share. 
As Autodata reports, the market for smaller cars is growing rapidly, up 59% last year 
while the overall car market was up just 1.5%. However, only 25% of vehicles Chrysler 
produced in 2006 were cars, with the remaining 75% being pick-up trucks, all-terrain 
vehicles or minivans. Sales of these vehicles have fallen, due to higher fuel prices and 
environmental concerns in the United States, resulting in Chrysler suffering huge losses. 
A Chrysler representative said that Chrysler cannot afford to build small cars in the 
United States, where labor and other costs are too high to make a profit. But in China, labor 
rates can be as low as $1 or $2 an hour, and building a modern auto plant can cost half as 
much as in the USA. “I don’t think Chrysler has much choice. None of the domestic 
companies can afford to locally produce their own vehicle for this pretty important segment,” 
said Tom Libby, senior director of industry analysis for the J.D. Power Network of J. D. 
Power and Company. “The problem for all of them is that this segment is quite important and 
it provides an entry way into the next segment up,” he said.  
 Chery is an aggressive company which is representative of China’s booming 
automobile industry. Last year, new vehicle sales in China soared 25.13% to 7.22 million 
units, allowing the country to overtake Japan as the world’s second largest market for new 
vehicles. Sources from the Chinese automobile industry said car sales in China will grow 
15% to hit 8 million units this year. 
Chrysler Group announced in February that it lost $1.5 billion in 2006 and planned to cut 
6,000 jobs in the next three years. “In accordance with the growing demand for automobiles 
in the Chinese market and strong growth in subcompacts in the U.S., such partnership would 
help us gain back 3,000 of those jobs,” said Chrysler Group spokesman Mike Aberlich. 
 
4. Headline: Partnership with Chinese automaker brings a bonanza of benefits as well as 
job concerns (Anti-trade & Loss Frames) 
Byline: Don Hammonds, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 
July 12, 2007 Thursday 
 
Chrysler Group announced Tuesday that it is moving ahead with plans to have Chinese 
automaker Chery build a subcompact car for the European North American markets. 
Partnership with a Chinese automaker could pose certain problems including job security for 
employees and automobile quality concerns. Chery is known for emphasizing low price parts, 
sometimes at the expense of quality. The deal will open the gate for future partnership 
expansions to include a variety of vehicles, not just small car. In turn, industry experts say the 
partnership could lead to increased imports and job exports. Moreover, the thought of losing 
America’s automotive prowess to China is unnerving. “It’s very clear that this country has an 
immense stake in the continuation of the domestic auto industry,” said Sander Levin, 
Chairman of the House Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee. “I’m in favor of that and 
whatever steps it takes.” 
The supervisory board of Chrysler has approved the framework of a limited partnership 
with Chery, and its decision to sell most of Chrysler to private equity firm Cerberus Capital 
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Management will not affect its businesses in China. However the deal is still pending final 
approval from the Chinese government. Since chief executive Dieter Zetsche made public 
May 14 that DaimierChrysler will cooperate with Chery, its stock has gained 25% to $90.96 a 
share. 
As Autodata reports, the market for smaller cars is growing rapidly, up 59% last year 
while the overall car market was up just 1.5%. However, only 25% of vehicles Chrysler 
produced in 2006 were cars, with the remaining 75% being pick-up trucks, all-terrain 
vehicles or minivans. Sales of these vehicles have fallen, due to higher fuel prices and 
environmental concerns in the United States, resulting in Chrysler suffering huge losses. 
A Chrysler representative said that Chrysler cannot afford to build small cars in the 
United States, where labor and other costs are too high to make a profit. But in China, labor 
rates can be as low as $1 or $2 an hour, and building a modern auto plant can cost half as 
much as in the USA. “I don’t think Chrysler has much choice. None of the domestic 
companies can afford to locally produce their own vehicle for this pretty important segment,” 
said Tom Libby, senior director of industry analysis for the J.D. Power Network of J. D. 
Power and Company. “The problem for all of them is that this segment is quite important and 
it provides an entry way into the next segment up,” he said.  
 Chery is an aggressive company which is representative of China’s booming 
automobile industry. Last year, new vehicle sales in China soared 25.13% to 7.22 million 
units, allowing the country to overtake Japan as the world’s second largest market for new 
vehicles. Sources from the Chinese automobile industry said car sales in China will grow 
15% to hit 8 million units this year. 
Chrysler Group announced in February that it lost $1.5 billion in 2006 and planned to cut 
6,000 jobs in the next three years. “Considering the growing demand for automobiles in the 
Chinese market and strong growth in subcompacts in the U.S., we would still have to cut 
3,000 of those jobs, even under the partnership with Chinese Chery,” said Chrysler Group 
spokesman Mike Aberlich. 
 
Stimuli Story 2 
 
1. Headline: Candymaker to transform future production operations (Pro-trade & Loss 
Frames)  
Byline: Harold Brubaker, The Philadelphia Inquirer 
July 24, 2007 Tuesday 
 
The Hershey Co., whose name has been synonymous with U.S. candy making for more 
than a century, announced its restructuring plan July 15. The company said it will outsource 
production of low value-added items, scale back production lines in the U.S. and Canada, 
reduce Hershey’s existing work force by about 3,000, and build a new plant in Mexico. The 
realignment is expected to yield savings of $170 million to $190 million a year by 2010, due 
to cheaper raw materials and labor costs outside the U.S. Hershey reaffirmed its long-term 
target for sales growth of 3 % to 4%. Last month, Hershey reported a 10 percent drop in 
fourth-quarter earnings on lackluster sales.  
Since the July 15 announcement of the restructuring, the company’s share price has risen 
almost 6%. 
Richard H. Lenny, Hershey CEO said the restructuring plan will enable the company to 
increase its North American leadership and develop “a truly global footprint for Hershey’s 
iconic brands.” “We are confident that we’ll be back on track,” Lenny said, “we are excited 
about our business prospects for 2007 and beyond.” Some analysts praised the move. Andrew 
Lazao of Lehman Brothers wrote: “Bottom-line, this plan would trim costs, improve profit 
margins and provide Hershey with far more marketing firepower, behind which to invest in 
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its core brands… as well as new platforms,” such as premium and dark chocolate.  
As part of the plan, Hershey will eliminate a third of its production lines in the United 
States, and plans to cut 3,000 jobs. This will make the proportion of Hershey’s manufacturing 
done in the U.S. and Canada shrink from 90% currently to 80%, said Hershey Spokesman 
Kirk Saville. However, since the realignment includes expansion of some plants and more 
investment in advertising and sales sectors, the net job cut in the U.S. will drop to 1,500 over 
the next three years. 
 
2.  Headline: Candymaker to transform future production operations. (Pro-trade & 
Gain Frames) 
Byline: Harold Brubaker, The Philadelphia Inquirer 
July 24, 2007 Tuesday 
 
The Hershey Co., whose name has been synonymous with U.S. candy making for more 
than a century, announced its restructuring plan July 15. The company said it will outsource 
production of low value-added items, scale back production lines in the U.S. and Canada, 
reduce Hershey’s existing work force by about 3,000, and build a new plant in Mexico. The 
realignment is expected to yield savings of $170 million to $190 million a year by 2010, due 
to cheaper raw materials and labor costs outside the U.S. Hershey reaffirmed its long-term 
target for sales growth of 3 % to 4%. Last month, Hershey reported a 10 percent drop in 
fourth-quarter earnings on lackluster sales.  
Since the July 15 announcement of the restructuring, the company’s share price has risen 
almost 6%. 
Richard H. Lenny, Hershey CEO said the restructuring plan will enable the company to 
increase its North American leadership and develop “a truly global footprint for Hershey’s 
iconic brands.” “We are confident that we’ll be back on track,” Lenny said, “we are excited 
about our business prospects for 2007 and beyond.” Some analysts praised the move. Andrew 
Lazao of Lehman Brothers wrote “Bottom-line, this plan would trim costs, improve profit 
margins and provide Hershey with far more marketing firepower, behind which to invest in 
its core brands… as well as new platforms,” such as premium and dark chocolate.  
As part of the plan, Hershey will eliminate a third of its production lines in the United 
States, and plans to cut 3,000 jobs. This will make the proportion of Hershey’s manufacturing 
done in the U.S. and Canada shrink from 90% currently to 80%, said Hershey Spokesman 
Kirk Saville. However, since the realignment includes expansion of some plants and more 
investment in advertising and sales sectors, 1,500 of those jobs will be gained back over the 
next three years. 
 
3.  Headline: Candymaker to transform future production operations (Anti-trade & 
Loss Frames) 
Byline: Harold Brubaker, The Philadelphia Inquirer 
July 24, 2007 Tuesday 
  
The Hershey Co., whose name has been synonymous with U.S. candy making for more 
than a century, announced its restructuring plan July 15. The company said it will outsource 
production of low value-added items, scale back production lines in the U.S. and Canada, 
reduce Hershey’s existing work force by about 3,000, and build a new plant in Mexico. The 
realignment is expected to yield savings of $170 million to $190 million a year by 2010, due 
to cheaper raw materials and labor costs outside the U.S. Hershey reaffirmed its long-term 
target for sales growth of 3% to 4 %. Last month, Hershey reported a 10 percent drop in 
fourth-quarter earnings on lackluster sales.  




David Lawrence, president of the Smiths Falls & District Chamber of Commerce, said 
“we’re really disappointed as a community.” The closing is a “major blow” to Smiths Falls, 
he said. “Not just an economic blow, but the whole image of who we are.” Hershey invested a 
substantial amount of money in the plant seven years ago. David said the plant has been 
profitable, and no specific reasons were given for the closing. Dennis Bomberger, a union 
leader express outrage: “Moving their operation to Mexico to save money is nothing but a 
bald-faced lie. The truth is they only wish to further line their pockets at the expense of 
American workers.” 
As part of the plan, Hershey will eliminate a third of its production lines in the United 
States, and plans to cut 3,000 jobs. This will make the proportion of Hershey’s manufacturing 
done in the U.S. and Canada shrink from 90% currently to 80%, said Hershey Spokesman 
Kirk Saville. However, since the realignment includes expansion of some plants and more 
investment in advertising and sales sectors, the net job cut in the U.S. will drop to 1,500 over 
the next three years. 
 
4.  Headline: Candymaker to transform future production operations (Anti-trade & 
Gain Frames) 
Byline: Harold Brubaker, The Philadelphia Inquirer 
July 24, 2007 Tuesday 
 
The Hershey Co., whose name has been synonymous with U.S. candy making for more 
than a century, announced its restructuring plan July 15. The company said it will outsource 
production of low value-added items, scale back production lines in the U.S. and Canada, 
reduce Hershey’s existing work force by about 3,000, and build a new plant in Mexico. The 
realignment is expected to yield savings of $170 million to $190 million a year by 2010, due 
to cheaper raw materials and labor costs outside the U.S. Hershey reaffirmed its long-term 
target for sales growth of 3% to 4%. Last month, Hershey reported a 10 percent drop in 
fourth-quarter earnings on lackluster sales.  
Since the July 15 announcement of the restructuring, the company’s share price has risen 
almost 6%. 
David Lawrence, president of the Smiths Falls & District Chamber of Commerce, said 
“we’re really disappointed as a community.” The closing is a “major blow” to Smiths Falls, 
he said. “Not just an economic blow, but the whole image of who we are.” Hershey invested a 
substantial amount of money in the plant seven years ago. David said the plant has been 
profitable, and no specific reasons were given for the closing. Dennis Bomberger, a union 
leader expressed outrage: “Moving their operation to Mexico to save money is nothing but a 
bald-faced lie. The truth is they only wish to further line their pockets at the expense of 
American workers.” 
As part of the plan, Hershey will eliminate a third of its production lines in the United 
States, and plans to cut 3,000 jobs. This will make the proportion of Hershey’s manufacturing 
done in the U.S. and Canada shrink from 90% currently to 80%, said Hershey Spokesman 
Kirk Saville. However, since the realignment includes expansion of some plants and more 
investment in advertising and sales sectors, 1,500 of those jobs will be gained back over the 
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